



THE PUEBLO: A JURIDICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED AND THE ALTERNATIVES
AVAILABLE UNDER EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW
AS APPLICABLE TO A COASTAL STATE'S SEIZURE









THE PUEBLO: A JURIDICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CONSIDERATIONS
INVOLVED AND THE ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE UNDER
EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLICABLE TO




Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, September 1962
Georgetown University
Bachelor of Laws, June 1965
State University of New York, Buffalo
A Thesis submitted to
the Faculty of
The National Law Center
of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of International Law
September 30, 1969
Thesis directed by
Dr. William Thomas Mallison, Jr., Professor of Law
•.
UW'AKY









II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 7
A. Coercive Situation in Korea 7
1
.
The Korean War Era 7
2. The Events Following the Armistice 9
B. The Pueblo Incident of January 23, 1968 11
1 The Factual Account 11
2. The Issue of Location 12
Claims by the United States 12
The Claims of North Korea 15
3. The Dispute as to the Vessel's
Function 17
A General Description of the Pueblo . .
.
17
Claims by the North Korean Government. 19
Claims by the United States Government. 20
III THE CENTRAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PUEBLO
INCIDENT 22
IC THE APPLICABLE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE SEA 25
A. The Concepts of Sovereignty and Jurisdiction. 25
B. State Territory and the World's Seas 27
1. State Territory 27





3. Jurisdictional Claims to "Effective
Control" by States over Seas
Adjacent to Their Territory 33
A. Historical Development of the Jurisdictional
Claims to Adjacent Seas 35
B. Modern Claims to Broader Jurisdiction Over
the Territorial Seas 41
C. The Meaning of Territorial Seas Jurisdiction, 43
D. Limited State Claims to Jurisdiction Beyond
the Territorial Waters—Contiguous Zones.... 48
V THE CONTENT OP THE CRISIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF NORTH KOREA 53
A. A State of War or Peace? 53
1. Legality of the United Nations*
Actions in Korea 54
2. The Status of the United States Rela-
tive to its Position in the Korean
Conflict 58
3. The Juridical character of the United
Nations' Action in Korea 61
4. The Legal Status Created by the
Korean Armistice 63
B. A Legal Analysis of the Claims surrounding
the Seizure of the Pueblo 68
1 . The Korean Claims 69
The Pueblo was an "armed spy ship"
of the United States 69
That the Vessel Violated the Territor-






2 . United States Counterclaims 72
The Seizure as Piracy 72
That the Seizure was Illegal per se
as a Matter of International Law 74
C. Aggression, Self-Defense, and the Pueblo 81
D. The parties to the Incident in the Light
of the Situation 89
1. The Participants 89
2. The Claimants' Objectives Regarding the
Pueblo and its Seizure 92
3. The Methods Used by the Claimants to
Win Their Objectives 97
4. Limitations in Claims of Self-Defense. . . . 100
5. The Conditions Needed to Justify Claims
of Self-Defense 104
6. Effects and Proportionality of the
Responding Coercion Ill
VI THE LIMITS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CORRECTING THE INADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT WORLD
ORDER SYSTEM IN FACE OF A MILITARILY COERCIVE ACT 113
SUCH AS THE SEIZURE OF A WARSHIP
A. The Result of the Incident Relative to
International Law 113
B. Acts Authorized in Intelligence-gathering




2. Activities in the Airspace 115
3. Intelligence Gathering Activities at Sea. 117
iv
• • • • •
Page
C. Sanctions Against such Intelligence-Gather-
ing Activities Provided by International
Law 117
1. Sanctions Against Satellites in Space.... 117
2. Sanctions Against the Use of Airspace
for Intelligence Gathering 118
3. Sanctions Provided by International Lqw
to Intelligence-Gathering Vessels on the
Seas 119




. , . . .
I INTRODUCTION
On August 5, 1945 the United States of America dropped
the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. This event plunged
the world into a new era in which massive destruction through
atomic fission could be easily accomplished. Since that time
humankind has been desperately attempting to evolve itself so
as to be able to cope with the new environment to which his
technical ingenuity has brought him. World diplomatic diffi-
culties and international intrigues are basically no different
today than those of the lawt few centuries. Nor has mankind
appreciably evolved during this period. Yet his ability to
apply knowledge to his benefit and, more terrifying, to his
own obliteration, has sent him searching for an effective
means to develop a world order system capable of preventing
his own destruction.
Unfortunately, no ready formula exists. Nor does it
appear that once it is found it will be capable of immediate
application. A slow transition is inevitable. During this
stage of evolution, rules and a means of enforcement are
necessary to prevent the machinations of men and nations from




develop. Only law, especially the science of international
lav, can form the keystone upon which we can successfully
complete the odyssey. The prize is more than peace, it is
existence. The perils comprise more than the horrors of
war and economic waste but promise total obliteration.
The world is divided into two ideological camps. The
one maintains that the economic and political structure of
it-«? society should be determined by the will of all the people
as much as possible for an orderly society. The otner adopts
an ideology which claims that tne avaricious tendencies of
men by their nature create strata of society thereby providing
oppression and injustice, and until the ultimate economic state
of perfect and equal sharing of resources is reached the State
must completely control socieity to achieve the destruction of
all strata of society. The United States leads the "free"
nations as it is at present the greatest economic and political
State of that bloc of nations. The otner is represented by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, also a military super-
power. TV5th States are nuclear giants as well, and between
then have the capability of destrovim the planet thov both
share.
Since the conclusion of the Seconc world War historical
developmen - ive created a contusion of cical ana economic
entanglements which have placed the world on the brink
nuclear obliteration. Although these monox ive
as
ultimately begun to appreciate the vast destructive force
each has at its disposal and now attempts to establish means
by which it can prevent an accidental destruction of civili-
zation, the third world, comprising over one hundred new and
weaker states, is continually in flux as each vies for
advantage and influence. The result is a game of Russian
roulette where the international commitments of these nuclear
giants, both of which desire to win over to their side the
uncommitted nations, are forced to move and counter move and
continually escalate international pressures in an effort to
maintain a balance of power.
The struggle between the giants for nuclear superiority
led them to ignore the danger inherent in the spread of wea-
pons of mass destruction to other States. In 1968, only after
at least three other States have developed the capacity to
manufacture and deliver nuclear weapons, have the United
States and the U.S.S.R. agreed on a Nuclear-Non-Proliferation
Treaty. This could well be too little and too late since France
and Communist China, both of whom possess nuclear weapons,
have refused to become parties to the Convention as have the
other States such as Israel and West Germany—who have the
capability of manufacturing such weapons systems. The threat
of a nuclear holocaust initiated from Nations other than the
United States or the U.S.S.R. is a reality both States must
consider in the conduct of their international relations.
I
Nevertheless these great States, knowing the risk of
war, are compelled to continue developing more powerful
weapons in an attempt to remain at least partially invulner-
able to an attack against thera. Both States have secret
services which conduct intelligence-gathering operations,
whether overt or covert, so that they may each remain as
completely informed as possible about the other side. And
each is required, often unwillingly, to fully live up to its
agreements and alliances, such as in the case of the war in
Viet-Nam, to demonstrate its strength and resolve to maintain
its honor and purpose.
Both States, as part of their intelligence-gathering
operations, use their warships, among other devices, to
gather information regarding the operations of the other
camp. The United states has taken the position that intelli-
gence ships, especially when they are foseign warships, are
immune from seizure or, in fact, any interference on the
high seas.-'- Soviet intelligence ships regularly take station
in South Korean waters, the waters off the coast of Viet-Nam,
and at the United States Air Base in Guam. They are also
stationed off the harbors of San Francisco and Charleston,
South Carolina, observing the movement of the nuclear sub-
marines of the United States. 2 These vessels have not been
interfered with, although they remain under surveillance.










The seizure of the Pueblo brought a new dimension into
international law. The modern world, with its rapid means of
transportation and communications, abetted by weapons systems
capable of swift and terrifying world obliteration, adds greatly
to the difficulty of attaining anc* maintaining min /orId
public order. Today it is no longer possible to enforce
international law unilaterally and the application of military
force, even by a super-state against a much weaker nation, is
a decision only the most foolhardy would embrace without
careful reflection.
Yet it would be irrational to allow the public order
of the oceans to be destroyed for lack of effective sanctions.
This study will examine, using a detailed analysis of
the Pueblo incident as an example, the alternatives available
to competing state interests in the use of the world's oceans
for self-defensive intelligence-gathering where these rights
conflict with rights of a state to guard against attack and
subversion, recommending a solution which can most eas:
fit into our present world public order system in such a
manner that an optimum level of freedom in the use of the
world's seas may be maintained at a minimum risk of worl
annihilation. The importance of an imme Uate, practical solu-
ion, short of war, in the seizure i a foreign warshif
in the fact that a futute solution under an
'
order system is of little value viien the hazard of nuclear
obliteration from such activities is a current fact. This
study will be more timely if a presently valid solution
capable of immediate implementation in an existing world
order system is proposed, rather than finding a solution
which will depend upon the happening of a number of fortui-




A. Coercive Situation in Korea
*• The Korean War Era .
At the end of the Second World War Japan was dispos-
sed of Korea, which was then occupied in the nortii by the
U.S.S.R. and in the south by the United States. Kim 11 Sung
headed the Communist North and the United States created a
democratic government in South Korea. The Russians not only
fought against the establishment of such a government, but
vetoed her admission into the United Nations when she failed
in her main objective. American Irroops withdrew in June 1949
amid speculation that a relatively strong North Koreas,
Russian-trained, army would descend on the relatively weak
Republic of South Korea. Nevertheless, Secretary of State
Acheson stated that South Korea was not within the United
States defense perimeter.
On June 25, 1950 that which was so much feared occurred
At approximately 4:00 A.M., local time, the bombardment began
North Korean troops invaded the South at eight o'clock in the
T. A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American





8morning and two hours later a declaration of war was broad-
cast by the North Korean Government. ^ The United Nations
Security Council met in an emergency meeting at Lake Success
and by a 9-0 vote (Yugoslavia abstaining) found North Korea
guilty of breaking the peace. It demanded that the North
Korean Government pull back its troops to the 38th parallel. 5
The representative of the U.S.S.R. did not vote. That dele-
gation was boycotting all United Nations proceedings in
protest against its failure to accept the delegation of
Communist China in the seat of the Security Council occupied
by the Nationalist Chinese representative. In the balance
against ignoring the invasion of South Korea by the Communist
North rested not only the probability of a new world confla-
gration but, more important, the very existence of the United
Nations as an effective instrument for maintaining the peace
and security of the world. While the United states was urging
intervention by the United Nations she began, independently,
to rush arras and military assistance to the embattled South
Korean regime." When North Korea ignored a second United
Nations order for withdrawal, the Security Council authorized
its member nations to use armed force in repelling the invasion
of South Korea and restoring international peace and security. 7
4N.Y. Times , June 25, 1950, at 1, col. 1.
5Id.
,
June 26, 1950, at 1, col. 8; 6Id., col. 7.





President Truman appointed General MacArthur to command
United States forces in Korea pursuant to the United Nations
authorization. The British Government placed its Pacific
Fleet under General MacArthur' s command, as did Australia
and New Zealand, on June 25, 1950. President Truman, however,
made it clear that the United States was not at war, stating
that this was a police action for the United Nations against an
"unlawful bandit attack on the South Korean Republic." 9 His
position was further enforced when the United Nations authorized
the United States to form a Unified Command with General
MacArthur as Supreme Commander, and permitted that Command to
use the United Nations flag. 10
The fighting continued for over three years. The first
meeting for armistice talks began at Kaesong on July 10, 1951,
but a truce was not declared until the signing of the armistice
agreement on July 27, 1953.
^
9
* The Events Following the Armistice .
The truce ended the fighting between the 7Jnited Nations
and the North Korean Government. It failed to settle any of
the issues. The governments of both halves of Korea were, as
ever, determined to reunite Japan's former possession. In
8N.Y. Times , June 29, 1950, at 1, col.
9 Id., June 30, 1950, at 1, col. 5.
10Id., July 9, 1950, at 1, col. 5.
13




1954, the United States Air Force reported that the North
Koreans attacked an RB-45 aircraft over neutral waters. 12
Soon thereafter followed the seizure of two Canadian soldiers
in the neutral, demilitarized zone by North Korean troops. 13
In August 1955 the South Korean Government charged that the
North Koreans were floating anti-personnel bombs down the
Han River estuary, culminating in thirteen explosions which
caused six deaths and seven injuries to civilians. 14 Inci-
dents continued through 1955 and 1956. In June 1957 the
United Nations Commissioners advised the Communists that due
to the rearmament of the North Korean Army, it would no longer
be bound by the truce provisions requiring the maintenance of
the status quo ante regarding weapons and would rtarm the
South Korean Army with modern weapons. 15 Repeated violations
of the 1953 truce were also cited.
Seizures of fishing vessels, murders, ambushes, and
various other terrorist tactics, in unending repetition,
continued through the remaining Fifties and early Sixties.
The peace treaty, the difficult goal of the 1950* s, became
a virtual impossibility as the I960* a became history.
By 1967 ambush and infiltration activities by North
12N.Y. Times , Feb. 1, 1954, at 1, col. 2.
13
Id., Mar. 18, 1954, at 3, col. 5.
14Id., Aug. 7, 1955, at 14, col. 1.
15
Id., June 21, 1957, at 1, col. 5.
Im
11
Korea were reported to be on the increase and two supply trains
were sabotaged in September.*6 In the same month North Korea
charged that South Korean warships were violating her terri-
torial seas. She also fired upon and sank a South Korean
fishing vessel.^ on January 22 , 1968 The New York Times
reported that thirty-one infiltrators had entered South Korea
on an unsuccessful mission to assassinate the South Korean
President. 18
B. The Pueblo Incident of January 23. 1968
1. The Factual Account .
At approximately 12:00 P.M., Eastern Standard Time, on
January 23, 1968, naval vessels of the North Korean People's
Democratic Republic surrounded the United States naval vessel
PUEBLO (AGER-2 ) which was at that time cruising off the coast
of North Korea, boarded her, capturing her crew, and took her
into the port of Wonson on North Korea's eastern coast. 9 The
incident began approximately two hours earlier when a North
Korean coastal patrol boat approached the Pueblo and, using
international signals, first requested the ship's nationality,
and then ordered the Pueblo to "Heave to or (it would) open
fire." pueblo replied that it was in international waters. 20
16N.Y, Times, Sept. 14, 1967, at 21, col. 1.
17
Id., Sept. 22, 1967, at 3, col. 2.
l8Id., Jan. 22, 1968, at 3, col. 3







The patrol boat continued to circle the Pueblo . Three other
patrol craft belonging to the North Korean Navy joined their
sister-ship and the four of them surrounded the Pueblo , closed
in and boarded her. The actual boarding occurred at 1:45 P.M. 21
A few shots were fired across the Pueblo '
s
bow. The New York
Times reported, based on the testimony at the Navy investiga-
tion of the incident, that Captain Bucher was injured and a
Fireman named Hodges was killed when one of the Korean vessels'
missiles penetrated the Pueblo '
s
superstructure, causing loose
metal fragments to fly about. the vessel. 22
2. The Issue of Location .
Claims by the United States ;
The United States Department of Defense reported that
the Pueblo was boarded 25 miles off the coast of North
Korea. ^ The reported position of the Pueblo at the time of
the boarding was 127 54.3'E; 39°25 , N. 24
The United States took a strong official position!
President Johnson, in a speech given on the twenty-sixth of
January, saying in part ". . . . This week the North Koreans
21
N.Y. Times , Jan. 24, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
22
Id., Jan. 23, 1969, at 1, col. 7.
23
Id., Jan. 24, 1968, at 1, col. 8.
24
Id., at 14, col. 5. Although this position was later
revised to 16 miles off the North Korean coast, both positions





committed yet another wanton and aggressive act by seizing
the American ship Pueblo and its crew in international waters.
Clearly this cannot be accepted. "25 secretary of State Dean
Rusk declared that the United States was determined to get
the Pueblo back ". . .by whatever means it takes." 26 And,
in a speech before the Brooklyn Cathedral Club in New York
City on January 25, Secretary Rusk emphasized ". . . . The
seizure of a United States naval vessel in international
waters is without precedent and is intolerable. And there
can be no satisfactory result, short of prompt, may I say
immediate, release of that ship and its officers and crew."27
This was followed by a statement in the United Nations
by Ambassador Goldberg, our then representative to that inter-
national organization, which clearly stated the position of
the United States:
"
. . . . The strict instructions under which the
Pueblo was operating required it to stay at least
thirteen nautical miles from the North Korean
coast. While my country adheres to the three-mile
rule of international law concerning territorial
waters, nevertheless the ship was under orders whose
effect was to stay well clear of the twelve-mile
limit which the North Korean authorities have by
long practice followed." 28
The Ambassador alleged three points in his speech
:
First, that the location of the Pueblo in international waters
25Dep't. State Bull., LVII.t ^Feb. 12, 1968), p. 189.
26












was fully known to the North Korean authorities; secondly,
so lightly armed was the Pueblo that the North Korean patrol
vessels reported it unarmed; and third, that the Pueblo was
in no position to engage in a hostile, warlike act toward the




. . in light of the comments of the distinguished
Soviet representative on the adoption of the agenda,
that Soviet ships engage in exactly the same activi-
ties as the Pueblo and sail much closer to the shores
of other states. And one such Soviet ship right now
is to be found in the Sea of Japan and currently is
not far from the North Korean shores."30
By Pebruary 2, 1968, the United States position as to
its intended response, failing the immediate return of the
criw and the vessel, had been moderately altered in that
diplomatic efforts were to be used, rather than military
coercion, in accomplishing the return of the ship, its officers
and crew. 31 The basic claim of the United states was that
under international law no nation has a right to seize a
warship of another nation whether on the high seas or in
territorial waters. But if a foreign warship enters terri-
torial waters, the littoral state may require it to depart
29Dep't. State Bull ., LVIII (Feb. 12, 1963V p. 196.
*°I£., P- 196 ?
31











immediately, and no more. 32
Immediately after the incident was reported it was
referred to as "a breach of international law amounting to
an act of war"33 and as "an act of piracy" by two senator*.
Although these are not official positions of the Administra-
tion, they indicate the anger of the United States at
receiving the news of the seizure.
The Claims of North Korea ;
A similar analysis of the North Korean position is
difficult because they not only lack a forum such as the
United Nations in which to voice their claims and be subject
to rebuttal, but they also tend to use news releases and the
like to propagandize rather than actually attempt to bolster
their international importance. When arguments against the
West are expounded only for consumption in the world market
of public opinion, it is almost impossible to give a fair
analysis of their contents.
North Korean authorities claimed that the Pueblo had
intruded into the territorial waters of the People's Democratic
Republic and was carrying out "hostile activities." The Pueblo
32Dep't. State Bull ., LVIH^Feb. 12, 1966), p. 3J2. An
address given by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in which he said
in part: "The most essential fact is that under accepted
international law Hofcth Korea has no right to seize the Pueblo
—either on the high seas or in territorial waters. The
Convention on the Law of the Sea adopted in 1958, makes it en-
tirely clear that, if any warship comes inside the territorial
33*"N.Y. Times




*Id. , at 14, col. V.
51
16
was referred to in North Korean news releases as "an armed
spy boat of the United States imperialist aggressor force." 5
The Pyongyang broadcast alleged that "while on the sea they
(the United States) sent an armed vessel of the United States
forces to intrude into the waters off Wonsan and perpetrate
serious provocation." They claimed that warnings had been
broadcast to the United States to keep out of North Korean
waters and that the United States armed vessel had used the
cover of South Korean fishing fleets to intrude into North
Korean waters. 37
The New York Times , on April 17, 1968, carried an article
stating that North Korean authorities released photographic
copies of documents which they claim were seized from the
Pueblo and which prove beyond doubt that the Pueblo had in-
truded into North Korean territorial waters and, indeed, that
it had orders to do so in spite of the claims of the United
States Government to the contrary. 38 Beyond this statement, no
waters, the coastal state can require it to leave but does not
have the right to seize it." It should be noted that North
Korea is not a party to that Convention. Yet, considering the
number of nations (49) which ratified that Convention (see U.S.
Naval War College, International Law Studies 1959-60 , app. J,
p. 264) it could be considered by some to be generally accep-
ted international law binding on all nations. The issue, how-
ever, is not as cut and dried as the Secretary's reiuarks might
lead one to believe.
35N.Y. Times . Jan. 24, 1968, at 1, col. 8; 36Id.
37Id., Jan. 27, 1968, at 28, col. 1.
3ft
14- • APr « 17 # 1968, at 3, col. 3.
6W
17
attempt was made by North Korea to prove, based on inde-
pendent evidence, that her claims were valid The documents
were never released to the public. Although many questions
arise as to the validity of the documents themselves or of
the North Korean allegations, it will not be examined here
as it is beyond the function of this paper to prove or dis-
prove the factual evidence and circumstances which surround
this incident. It remains that the North Korean Government
based its actions upon the intrusion of the Pueblo into that
Republic's territorial seas—a fact vehemently denied by the
Government of the United States.
3 . The Dispute as to the Vessel's Function.
A General Description of the Pueblo ;
The Pueblo is one of a clans of ships designated as
Auxiliary General Electronics Research ships (AGER). Every
ship of the United states Navy has a designation and cate-
gory symbol to identify its purpose, function, and classifi-
cation o The "A" can be said to stand for Auxiliary, as the
purpose of the vessel is not to directly assist in attacking
an enemy by firepower but rather to serve combatant vessels. 39
These particular vessels are equipped with highly sophisticated
electronic gear and are used to gather a wide range of data on
and concerning the oceans, their contents, ecology, floor and
39












suporadjacent air space. They store and examine the information
acquired for use in developing knowledge about the sea and
thereby expanding man's ability to use the resources of the
seas. Their information can also assist the combatant vessels
of the United States Navy in fulfilling its defensive functions
through such research. Depending upon the sophistication and
purpose of the equipment these ships can analyze radio and
radar signals, gather information on ocean sounds, and a great
variety of other information which may be useful to the Govern-
ment of the United States. It might be added that the term
"spy ship" is inaccurate and misleading, although it has been
used by various co:nraentators, newspapers, and the like to
describe the vessel.
These ships were converted from United States Army
diesel-powered light cargo ships (AKL) to their present naval
mission—intelligence-gathering. The vessels displace approxi-
mately 906 tons of water. They measure 179 feet from stem to
stern; are 33 feet abeam and have a draft of 10.2 feet. Their
approximate maximum speed is 12.2 nautical miles per hour
(2,000 yards). The Pueblo carried a complement of six officers,
seventy-five crew members, and two civilian personnel.40
The New York Times reported that according to informed,
but undisclosed, sources the Pueblo is crammed with various
electronic and sonar listening devices and reqqrding equipment. 41
40
N.Y. Times . Jan. 24, 1968, at 15, col. 2, and Mar. 24,
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A substantial amount of the equipment was used to collect
military intelligence information. The ship allegedly had
the capacity to intercept submarine messages* and record the
sounds of Russian submarines. It also had the capability to
locate the positions of land-based radar equipment and measure
the wave lengths. This would permit attacking aircraft, by
duplicating the wave patterns of a radar net, to remain un-
detected until it is too late for the defensive apparatus of
the nation being attacked to effectively mobilize against the
approaching menace. This class of vessels also carries com-
puters to analyze data. It is important that these ships
approach as close to the source of the waves being examined
as is possible, in order to get an accurate record of the
wave patterns and sounds. 42
Claims-by -the North Korean Government :
In the propaganda statements of the People's Democratic
Republic of North Korea, that Government accused the United
States of directing the Pueblo to engage in hostile activities
within eight miles of the North Korean coast—against its
people, 43 These activities consisted in gathering information
and electronic data from North Korea's communications and
42
N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 196G, at 10, col. 1, and at
15, col. 2.
43







defensive radar installations. 44 The Pueblo was also charged
with gathering information on the characteristic noise patterns
of Soviet submarines as well as data regarding the ocean floor
adjacent to the territorial waters off the North Korean
coast, 45
North Korea claimed that such activities constituted
spying, and alleged that this activity was aggressive. These
amounted to acts so hostile that the seizure was justified as
the only effective means to prevent serious injury to the
people of North Korea.
Claims by the United States Government ;
The United States Government officials stated that the
Pueblo was not a "spy ship" in the sense that its purpose was
to intrude in North Korean waters in order to carry out es-
pionage activities. Its objective, rather, was to remain well
outside of what the North Koreans claimed as their territorial
seas, to carry on a surveillance of radar and radio waves, and
to record "underwater sound" as well as to gather hydrographic
data.46 It was officially acknowledged that the Pueblo carried
highly-classified electronics equipment for intelligence-
gathering purposes. 47 The United SSates position, however, is that
44
N.Y. Times , Apr. 17, 1968, at 3, col. 3.
45 46
Id., Mar. 24, 1968, at 44, col. 4; Id.






the activity of the ship falls into that category of activity
which is permissible under international law. Therefore, not
omly can the Pueblo not be classified as an espionage vessel
but the seizure of a foreign man-of-war on the high seas i
itself a violation of international law as such vessels are
entitled o an 1 imm\
Convention on the High Seas, adopted at Gme
April 27, 1958 ( . oc. A/CONF. 13/L 53 and cor
r




Ill THE CENTRAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PUEBLO INCIDENT
The seizure of the Pueblo , a vessel classified as a
warship, under international law of the sea, created new
problems for the nations of the world and brought to the
fore the need to either eliminate intelligence gathering
by warships and military aircraft as is presently practiced
by the United States and the Soviet Union or, in the Alter-
native, establish a regime by which such activity may be
pursued without the risk of a major confrontation perpet-
rated by a relatively small nation with substantially less
to lose than the great world powers.
Since the elimination of such activities is remote
indeed, this being reconfirmed by the downing of a United
States Naval intelligence-gathering aircraft on April 15,
1969 at the hands of North Korea?9 and its aftermath, 50 it
is imperative that legal issues be examined and understood
so that the world community can act appropriately and
effectively to maintain a peaceful world order in the face
of present world tensions.
49
The Washington Star, Apr. 15, 1969, at 1, col. 8.
50
Id., Apr. 18, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
22





The principal issues of this study are two: First is
whether a nation can legally pursue intelligence-gathering
activities under thf ting world publi : order s
within the framework of international law, most tirectl
current international law of the sea, without becoming
aggressor state whose activities constitute a threat to or a
breach of the peace under the law of nations. The second
question is whether a state, under internsitional law, tld
be allowed to interfere with the reconnaissance mission of a
foreign state's warship which is attempting to acquire informa-
tion regarding that state's defensive and offensive ilities,
Assuming some response is proper, what is the most appropriate
means and by what proportionate sanction
world public order system be maintained in adjusting the
injustices arising from this clash of mutually-exclusive values?
In order to answer these principal issu-
inary and corollary questions must 30 that a
solution may be effectively and mea. illy reach,
. .'he
applicable principals of international 1 1 and
ir development relevant to
.
?ueblo 1 nt is beii. :; the I of
this paper, crela of
: ca and thf . ' e
analyzed. Next





at what points international regula oreaks down in the face
of such crises and where augmentation is requir
Finally, an attempt will be made to find a practical
solution to these crisis situations in an effort to give the
parties guioance and a satisfactory option to _ . . by
action ox b} g a x
spec: l^c
11 of any I -ises
.o_ ; -968
.
IV THE APPLICABLE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
A. The Concepts of Sovereignty and Jurisdiction
Sovereignty is a high degree of fcrmal authority, vir-
tually independent of other earthly authority. Sovereignty
rests in entities called states and is manifest by the power
to make laws and to rule. Sovereignty is independent within
each state but is limited without the state by the rights of
other sovereign stat4s. Conduct between sovereign states is
thus regulated through what is known as the "Law of Nations,"
manifest as frequently in its breach as in its observance. 5 ^-
All independent political entities on this planet are con-
sidered to be sovereign and—together with three other quali-
ties—a community of people settled and living together in a
defined geographical area, ruled by a person or group of
people under the law of the land, comprise nation-states. 52
Due to the inter-relationships of a world made smaller by
51
H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International Law , Vol. 1









the ever-advancing technological developments in the fields of
coiomunication and transportation, together wxth the complexi-
ties of a developing world economic structure, we find that
—to borrow an Orwellian phrase—some states are "more equal
than others" in fact, despite the international concept of
equal states. Nevertheless, within the territory of each
state, its government possesses the supreme authority to rule
its citizens as it deems most advantageous for its social
structure.
Jurisdiction is the term traditionally used to describe
the area within which a state is competent to exercise its
sovereignty by enforcing its policy therein. 5^ por example,
a state's competence to apply its policy to foreign vessels
in its territorial sea would be an exercise of sovereignty.
A state's jurisdiction is, in turn, subject to certain ex-
tensions and limitations under international law. At this
point they will be referred to only briefly. Every state is
entitled by international law to claim extraterritoriality
—
exemption from local jurisdiction from other states for visit-
ing heads of state, its diplomatic envoys, its men-of-war,
and its armed forces.^ At the same time, the Law of Nations
permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over its subjects
H. S. Mc Dougal and W. T. Burke, The Public Order of
the Oceans (1st ed., 1965), p. 1S2.
54




traveling abroad, within its own territory, since right
is based on the individual citizen and his allegiance to his
state. 55 Delimitation of the right to exercise jurisdiction
as well as the requirement to restrain it has developed
historically through treaty and custom and, it might be said,
has placed limitations on the sovereignty of nation states in
their attempts to find a means to v/ori: together.
B. State Territory and the World* 3 Seas
1. State Territory .
The territory of a state consists of the land mass over
which its government holds control and exercises its juris-
diction: the waters within the state, and those immediately
adjacent to it in the situation where a state borders on the
seas of the world, tfhese being designated "internal waters."
Other areas of the ocean adjacent to the external waters and
the airspace above extending at least as high as manned air-
craft can fly, are also subject to the jurisdiction of the
adjacent state. 5^ The importance of state territory rests
in the fact that within this geographical area government
jurisdiction and state sovereignty are virtually complete
and no other political power can exercise authority within
that physical delimitation. 57
55Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op_. cit








The various strata of jurisdiction which a state may
exercise to varying degrees is extremely important in order
to treat this subject properly, and will be thoroughly dealt
with immediately below. It is necessary and appropriate to
introduce, at this point, the ultimate extent of state terri-
torial sovereignty into the seas applicable to states littoral
to the world's oceans.
2 « The Open Seas.
The Open Seas comprise all the salt water surfaces of
the globe which are connected, from a navigational standpoint,
to the globe's great bodies of water; are susceptible to
international surface navigation and fishing; and which do
not fall within the categories of "internal waters," "maritime
belts," or other specialized zones claimed by states littoral
to the open seas and recognized de facto or de jure by other
nations of the world. For example, the Aral Sea in Russian
territory or the Great Salt Lake in the United States cannot
be classified as open seas. The Chesapeake Bay, although
navigable from the Atlantic, falls within the category of
"internal waters" as an historic bay and thus is not part
of the open seas.
The principle of "freedom of the seas" can be traced
from antiquity, although from the Middle Ages throughout the






world's oceans. 8 Freedom of the seas was most successfully
urged by Hugo Grotius in his thesis "On the Freedom of the
Seas, "59 first published in 1633. His basic proposition,
one which is now universally recognized—in principle at
least—declared that "that which cannot be occupied or which
has never been occupied can be no one * s property and that
which is constituted in such a manner that although serving
one person, it still suffices for the common use . . . ought
to remain in perpetuity in the same condition (regarding its
property right states) as when it was first created by
nature." 60
Although Grotius' proposition might be considered as
making the seas a "no-man's-land" respecting the jurisdiction
of states, this is not accurate. Basically, "freedom of the
seas" means that no single nation or group of nations can
restrict the use of the high seas to specified participant
states 6c for particular uses by legislative fiat or force
of arms. Nevertheless, the sea is subject to the Law of
Nations as the rule prohibiting exercise of sovereignty
demonstrates. 61 The United States throughout her history
50oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op_. cit
. , p. 582 et seq .
59H. Grotius, On the Freedom of the Seas (R. Magoffin
transl.. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1916).
6°IcL' P- 2 7.




has always maintained, with one exception, S2 freedom of the
open seas for fishing, commerce, and navigation.
The Convention on the High Seas, adopted by the Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958, 63 specified four
activities in which all states may engage without inter-
ference or restriction by other states. These four "freedoms,"
as they are called, include: navigation; fishing; laying
62This one exception occured in an effort by the United
States to prevent the pelagic sealers from exterminating the
great herds of fur-bearing seals. By the efforts to acquire
these pelts beyond United States jurisdiction, Canadian and
British sealers were slaughtering the herds at sea as they
approached their breeding grounds in the Pribilof Islands.
The herds estimated at 4 million dwindled to 100,000 by 1910,
immediately prior to the North Pacific Sealing Convention.
In 1886. the United States claimed virtual complete juris-
diction over a vast area of the North pacific Ocean extending
south from its Alaskan territory, anl proceeded to ^eize
foreign sealing vessels in an effort to save the seals. A
few years prior to this, when Alaska was part of the Russian
Empire, the United States and Great Britain had vigorously
objected to similar attempts at oceanic jurisdiction in the
same area by Russia, who desired it for security and exclusive
fishing purposes. (See T. A. Bailey, supra note 3, at 410
et . seer .) The United States jurisdictional claims were sub-
mitted to arbitration where they were defeated in favor of
the principle of freedom of the seas. The seals were ulti-
mately saved by means both diplomatic and legislative. (See
Oppenheim-Lauterpachtt supra note 51, at 620 et. seq .)
63Adopted by the Conference on April 27, 1958, U.NW.
Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 53 and correction 1. (See U.S. Naval
War College, supra note 32, app. B, at 203 et seq .
)
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submarine cables and pipelines, and overflight. 64 As this
Convention implies, the high seas are subject to the juris-
diction of states in some forms
With some variations, jurisdiction on the open seas is
based on the maritime flag and therefore the law of the state
is applicable to and enforceable against the vessels, persons,
and property sailing under that state's maritime flag while
they are navigating the high seas. 65 While on the high seas
private vessels are treated as though they are floating por-
tions of the flag state, as long as they remain under the ex-
clusive jurisdiction and control of the flag state. 66 Thus
crimes committed aboard such vessels; births, deaths, marria-
ges, and contracts entered into, while such vessels are on
the high seas, are subject to the laws of the flag state.
64
Convention on the High Seas, art. 2. See note 63
supra
. See also McDougal and Burke, supra note 53, at 751
et seq ., and at 84, note 188, where examples of other free-
doms of the seas such as the right 66 use the oceans for
military maneuvers and the testing of various weapons are
cited to point out that the "four freedoms" cited in the
Convention are too restrictive to be a complete listing
recognized as generally applicable international law.
Since the freedoms of the high seas include any uses which
do not interfere unreasonably with the rights of others to
use the same seats for the same or other purposes, it is
reasonable to assume that intelligence-gathering by vessels
in the open seas must be regarded as acceptable conduct
under the doctrines of the international law of the sea.






In addition, every maritime state, by customary inter-
national law, may punish pirates and seize their vessels,
wherdver found, although they must receive a trial in and
according to the laws of the capturing state. ' Warships of
all countries have certain rights to pursue and search foreign
merchant ships on the high seas in addition to the rights to
suppress piracy and slave trade. ° Although seizure for
piracy is permitted by the Convention on the High Seas 69 it
may only be carried out by warships, military aircraft, or
other ships or aircraft on government service expressly
authorized to do so.™
The Law of Nations has customarily characterized
men-of-war and other public vessels of states as floating
portions of the flag state, whether on the high seas or in
foreign territorial waters. 71 Article 8(1) of the Convention
on the High Seas specifically exempts warships from the
jurisdiction of any state other than its flag state. 72 In
section 2 of the same Article a warship is defined as
67
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 616.
68
.Id., at 594 et seq
. See also Convention on the High
Sfeas, art. 13.
69U.S. Naval War College, supra note 32 at 206-08,
arts. 14-21.
70
Id., at 208, art. 21.
71Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 597.
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"a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State andbbearing
the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality,
under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the
government and whose name appears on the Navy list, and
manned by a crew who are under regular naval discipline. "73
3. Jurisdictional Claims to "Effective Control"
by States over Seas Adjacent to Their Territory
.
In the case of a nation-state whose territory abuts on
the open seas, its jurisdictional authority can be divided
into three classifications: internal waters, mentioned above;
territorial waters? and contiguous zones.
The internal waters of a state consist—besides inland
lakes and rivers navigable to the sea--of harbors and bays;
inlets or gulfs which are surrounded by the land of one state
and the mouth of which is less than ten miles in width?' or
is landward of the base line drawn across the mouth of the
bay and conforming with the provisions of the Convention on
the Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone; 75 or which can be
classified as an historic bay. 76 These areas of jurisdiction
73
U.S. Naval War College, supfca note 32, at 205.
7^0ppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 460 and 505-08.
7
*U.S. Naval War College, supra note 32, at 194-96. Note
Article 7 of the Convention_on the Territorial Seas and the
Contiguous Zone, app. A. /Hereinafter cited as "The Convention/'/
76
•Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 506.
-; n$
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are also referred to as national waters. Within these waters
the state government has authority equal to that which it
enjoys on land—with exceptions so few and minor as to be
beyond the scope of this paper.
States littoral to international bodies of water exercise
sovereignty over a strip of the seas extending from base lines
along their coast out into the oceans for a determined number of
miles. The width of the zone varies with the claims of each
state, which is free within certain limits to determine the
extent of its own jurisdiction. Usually this imaginary boun-
dary (a "base line") follows the low water mark of the sea
along the littoral states' shores. 77 The Convention permits an
alternate means of determining the line of origin from which
this zone is measured, called the "straight base line method,"
which was first given international legal recognition by the
International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries
case. 7° This strip of the seas, actually an integral part of
the ocean itself, referred to as the maritime belt or terri-
torial waters, 79 is measured in miles from the low water mark
or the base line. The maximum extent of this strip is an
'
'Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 506.
78U.S. Naval war College, supra note 32 at 194, arts.
4, 5 (app. A). See n. 80 infra .




imaginary line, every point of v/hich is parallel to its point
of origin measured in miles claimed by the littcral state as
the extent of its territorial seas' jurisdiction with the
acquiescence of the other members of the community of nations.
Hence, the extent of a state's territorial waters' jurisdic-
tion will often be referred to as "three-mile limit," twelve-
mile limit, "and the like. The International Court of Justice
appears to say, however, that claims to territorial seas
sovereignty exceeding twelve miles are invalid. °°
A. Historical Development of the jurisdictional
Claims to Adjacent Seas.
The concept of territorial jurisdictional claims to the
waters adjacent to states littoral to the world's oceans can
be seen as a parallel development to the concept of freedom
of the seas. As the Middle Ages drew to a close and the
European Nation-states began to emerge, international trade
became significant. First, the great trading cities and
later, the seafaring states, attempted to maintain their
80Dicta in The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1951 a. C.J
Reports 116) . Herein the International Court of Justice accep-
ted as conforming to international law Norway's method of draw-
ing base lines along the seaward side of the archipelago which
ran parallel to northwestern coast from which she measured her
territorial waters. The result was to extend to the waters on
the landward side of this archipelago Norway's regime of
internal waters, which was previously considered ,by Great
Britain at least, to be open seas. The Convention recognized






profitable monopolies by laying claim to vast areas of the
world's seas and oceans. Venice laid claim to the entire
Adriatic Sea in 1269 as being within her exclusive jurisdic-
tion, exacting tolls from all foreign ships which plied its
waters.^ The trading cities of Genoa and Pisa likewise laid
claim to the Ligurian Sea. 82 To the North, the Kingdoms of
Denmark and Sweden divided the Baltic between them, while
England claimed sovereignty over the entire English Channel
as well as to a substantial area of the North Sea§8^
In the fifteenth century a dispute arose betweeanthe
then preeminent maritime nations, Spain and Portugal, as to
which parts of the world were to belong to each exclusively
for exploration, colonization, and trade. It was at this
time that the European monarchs were consolidating their
power, and political entities known as states were becoming
fully established. Also at this time the development of
water-borne transport had reached a point where long sea
voyages became a reality for trade and exploration and so
made the sea a principal means of travel and trade. Settle-
ment of this dispute between these two powers was attempted
through the efforts of the papacy when Alexander VI, in his
papal bull "Inter caestus," divided the world between them.
C. Bynkershoek, De Domino Maris Dissertatio (R.
Magoffin transl., New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1923), p. 15.
0. Svarlien, Introduction to the Law of Nations







The Western Hemisphere, v/ith the exception of Brazil, was
given to Spain. Portugal was to have for its bailiwick
those hitherto unexplored and uncolonized regions of the
Eastern Hemisphere. 8^ Based upon this document, Spain
claimed exclusive use of the central Atlantic Ocean within
which her trade routes to the New World passed. Portugal
claimed a monopoly over trade with lands washed by the
Indian Ocean and the islands in the Western Pacific.
England disputed Spanish claims to the New World and
exclusive use of the "Spanish Main, an issue virtually
decided with the destruction of Spain's Armada in 1588, while
the United Netherlands fought the monopolistic claims of
Portugal which conflicted with their trade with Ceylon,
the Celebes Island* , and the Western Moluccas thoough the
Dutch East India Company. For this reason Grotius published
his famous dissertation "On the Freedom of the Seas."85
Bynkershoek, writing about eighty years after Grotius,
840. Svarlien, Introduction to the Law of Nations ,
p. 185, and Bynkershoek, op_. cit . , p. 15
8 S
Grotius, supra note 59, at 7. See also A. G. Reppy,
"The Grotian Doctrine of Freedom of the Seas Reappraised,
"
19 Fordham L. Rev., (1950), p. 243 et se£. for an excellent
historical background from which originated the Grotian
doctrines regarding the uses of the high seas. Mr. Reppy
demonstrates that not only were the theses of Grotius never
wholly accepted regarding freedom of the seas but that, with
the emerging uses of the seabed, subsoil, and vertical
column of the world's oceans, the Grotian doctrines will
become further restricted in their scope and applicability





did not agree with his predecessor that the seas were com-
pletely open and incapable of occupation and ownership, but
rather that they were capable of being made subject to a state's
jurisdiction. He cited the case of the Mediterranean Sea in
the days of a thriving Roman Empire to demonstrate that even
a vast body of water could become a Mare Clausam where the
dominion over the surrounding land masses coupled with uncon-
tested occupation by powerful fleets could reduce an ocean to
the possession of a single state. 86 Since ownership of the
sea requires permanent occupation and exclusive, uncontested
control together with the intent to own and occupy the sea,
it was necessary to occupy and control the opposing land masses
adjacent to the sea. Since the land adjacent to the seas
represented a significant aspect of occupation of the seas,
Bynkershoek concluded that some area of the open seas could
be reduced to the sovereignty of the littoral state because
its territory abutted the sea—even though the sea was in-
capable of being occupied by one state. 87 And granting the
impossibility to control a vast ocean, he concluded that a
lesser part of the sea could be controlled by a single state.
As early as the beginning of the seventeenth century
the concept that a state could claim exclusive jurisdiction
over the seas adjacent to the land mass of the state itself




was promulgated. The distances claimed varied from 100 miles
(Bodin) or 60 miles (Selden) to the limit of vision. 88 These
were discussed and refuted by Bynkershoek.
Bynkershoek concluded that the proper and aost reasonable
delimitation should be based on the regulations for rendering
honors adopted by the Estates for the Belgic Confederation which
had decreed, in 1671, that foreign princes were to be saluted
when their ships reached the point to which their cities' cannon
could carry. The author concluded that control of the land over
the sea should be no further than permanent, forceful control
could be exercised. 8 ^ This doctrine has since become known as
"the cannon shot rule" and is generally accepted by the Western
Maritime Powers and Japan as the three-mile limit.
The Scandanavian States never accepted "the cannon shot
rule," but they contributed to the present law of the sea by
developing the concept of a maritime belt. After Greenland was
rediscovered in the seventeenth century the King of Denmark
claimed a Mare Clausam ,extending through the Northern Atlantic
between Greenland and Norway and Denmark. Danish licenses to
fish in these waters always excepted a belt of water around
the Danish possessions there—Iceland and the Faeroe Islands. 90




at 44. But see M. W. Mouton, The Continental
Shelf, p. 192 et seq . , where he alleges that "the cannon shot
rule" never existed.
90
H. S. Kent, The Historical Origins of the Three Mile
Limit
, 48 A.J.I.L. (1954), p. 537 et seq .
sri
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These maritime belts varied in width throughout the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, as Denmark considered necessary
for effective enforcement, but were fixed at four leagues during
the reign of Christian V in 1682 where they remained until 1836.
These Danish maritime belts were likewise used as neu-
trality zones during the various wars of this e«a between
France, England, and Holland. France attempted to obtain
Danish and Swedish recognition of a three-mile limit as it was
the probable maximum range of cannon. This was never specific-
ally accepted. Gradually, a one-league neutrality zone became
the acknowledged limit along the Danish coasts.
During the Seven Years War between France and England,
Sweden adopted (1758) a three-mile neutrality zone in which no
hostilities of any kind were permitted.^ This distance, prob-
ably adopted in deference to France, was increased to four
miles in 1779 to conform with the Danish neutrality belt. In
1836 a Danish ordinance adjusted the fishing zone to one
maritoft league around the coast of Iceland.
It was during the early nineteenth centure that "the
cannon shot rule," advocated by France, and the concept of
the maritime belt, used by the Scandanavian countries, melded
into the modern conception of a three-mile belt of territorial
seas as we understand it today.
91
H. S. Kent, "The Historical Origins of the Three Mile




B. Modern Claims to Broader Jurisdiction
Over the Territorial Seas
The three-mile limit was never universally recognized
but the matter lost its significance as long as the seas were
open and relative peace reigned in Europe—as it did through
most of the nineteenth century. In 1909, Imperial Russia
adopted a twelve-mile limit in order to protect her fishing
interests and her security along her Pacific Ocean seacoasts.
Great Britain and Japan refused to recognize the jurisdictional
extension. 9^ The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has con-
tinued to maintain a twelve-mile limit as the extent of her
territorial waters jurisdiction. 9 -*
In 1930 the Hague Codification Conference, 9^ attended by
forty-seven states and the then free city of Danzig, attempted
to establish, by Convention, a universal width of the maritime
belt. No agreement or compromise could be reached. At that
time the disputants argued between a six-mile limit versus a
three-mile limit. The principal advocates of the former
included Italy, Spain, Brazil, Persia, Roumania, Turkey,
and Yugoslavia; those states urging the latter limit included
Great Britain and her Dominions, the United States, France,
Germany, Japan, Belgium, China, Holland, and Poland. 95
92Colombos, The International Law of the Sea (5th ed..
1963), p. 78.
93U.S. Naval War College, supra note 32, at 285.
94
Id., at 1, Note 2.




Twenty-eight years later, in 1956, the United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea was convened in Geneva, Switzer-
land, and attended by eighty-six nations. 96 Although much was
done to consolidate the Law of the Sea, (four Conventions were
produced at the Conference), a solution to the variegated
patterns of maritime belts which were encroaching on the
world's seas could not be found. The infant coastal states,
former colonies of the European States, frequently claimed a
maritime belt of twelve miles—as did the majority of the
communist bloc members and a few States of the Middle East.
The three-mile limit, as well, maintained a large number of
adherents, as did the six-mile maritime belt. Nor did the
plethora of claims end here, but various states claimed four,
five, nine, and ten-mile territorial seas. Some claims ex-
tended to two hundred miles. Q 7 North Korea specifically claims
a maritime belt of twelve miles. $& Not being a member of the
United Nations, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea was
not represented at the Geneva Conference.
96
U.S. Naval War College, supta note 32, at 491, Note 2.
97
Id. , at 273 et seq.,(app. K) , lor the extent of terri-
torial seas jurisdiction claimed by various members of the
United Nations in 1958.
98
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In the ten years which have elapsed since the Conference,
the situation has become even more difficult to solve. Forty-
one members of the United Nations claim twelve miles jurisdic-
tion over the seas littoral to their coasts; twenty-three
states maintain a three-mile limit; and thirteen states adhere
to a six-mile maritime belt. Others claim territorial seas
varying from a minimum of four miles to a maximum assertion
of two hundred miles. 9^
C. The Meaning of Territorial Seas Jurisdiction
The issue of the breadth of the maritime belt is im-
portant. Although there is no unanimity as to the nature of
the right to territorial seas jurisdiction, it appears in the
practice of states that it is a form of sovereignty rather
than a form of riparian rights granted to landholders along
a stream or river under the internal law of Common Law
countries. Ifl does not appear, however, that the maritime
belt can be ceded by the littoral state to another nation,*00
Bynkershoek's opinion to the contrary, being no longer tenable,
notwithstanding . 101
Universal state practice indicates that the natural
resources, including the living resources of the sea, within
99W. L. Griffin, The Law of Ocean Space (temp. ed„, 1968),
p. 72 et seq . See also "National Council on Marine Resources
and Engineering Development," Marine Science Affairs (Jan. 1969),
app. c-4. p. 248.
°Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 463.








the maritime belt—whether above, on, or beneath the seabed
—
belong exclusively to the littoral state. 102 The littoral state
can control cabotage, intra-national seacoast trade within the
territorial sea, and exclude foreign vessels from such activity
within those seas. 103 Within the maritime belt the littoral
statfe exclusively exercises police, sanitary, customs, and
navigational authority and control. This control extends from
beneath the sea through the air above the maritime belt. 10^
For security purposes, among others, the littoral state can
establish routes for foreign vessels to take while trans-
navigating her territorial waters and prohibit the entrance
of those vessels into certain specified areas of the maritime
belt. 1(^ The state may also prescribe by laws and regulations
maritime ceremonies to be followed by foreign vessels while
using her territorial seas. 106
As extensive as is this jurisdiction it is limited in
important respects which distinguish it from the regime of
internal waters. Customary international law entitles all
foreign merchant vessels the right, in peacetime, to navigate
territorial seas of all states as long as that passage is
inoffensive to the littoral state. 107 Although the right to
grant similar passage was not generally recognized in inter-
national law regarding foreign men-of-war, usage of nations
102Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 492.
103 Id. , at 493; 104 Id. , at 487 et se£; 105Id. , at 493.
106Id., at 493; 107 Id.
: .
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generally permitted a similar freedom to warships in peacetime
as long as hhe passage was in no way hanmful or offensive to
the littoral sfate.108 However many international law scholars,
among them Elihu Root and W. E. Hall, maintained that because
war vessels by their very nature threaten, they have no right
of innocent passage. 109
In 1949 the International Court of Justice decided the
Corfu Channel Case. 110 It determined that international straits
were open to transnavigation by foreign men-of-war in time of
peace as long as that passage was innocent, and that no prior
notification by the vessel's flag state was required before
the transnavigation since such activity was granted under
international! law.
The Convention on the Territorial Seas and the Contiguous
Zone, Section III, 111 "codifies" the right of innocent pas-
sage, 1 *- 2 the decision in the Corfu Channel Case, 113 and defines
108
109
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 494.
Svarlien, supra note 82, at 195.
110The Corfu Channel Case (1949), I.C.J. Reports 4. See
also U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1948-
1949
, p. 109 et seq .
U.S. Naval War College, supra note 32, at 197-200.
112 Id. , at 197-98, art. 14;








the rights and duties of both the littoral statell4 and the
foreign vessel while navigating territorial seas, including
international straits. 115
The final distinction between the sovereignty of a
coastal wtate within its territory as opposed to that which
it exercises over its maritime belt, which bears mentioning
here, is the matter of jurisdiction over vessels navigating
through its belt. International law has virtually left a
void in this area. Some states, such as the United Kingdom,
have exercised jurisdiction by means of the Territorial
Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878, ^^ whereas many writers
believe that this is an improper exercise of jurisdiction. 117
The rule may be different, however, when the foreign merchant
vessel casts anchor in the territorial seas, 118 and state
practice varies.
The Convention limits jurisdictional exercise over
foreign merchant vessels in the territorial seas to four
categories: if the crime committed aboard the merchant ves-
sel extends to the coastal state; if the crime tends to disturb
114
U.S. Naval War College, supta note 32, at 198-200,
arts. 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 & 23.
115Id., at 197-200, arts. 14, 17, 19, 21, 22 & 23.
116
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 47.
117 118





the peace and tranquility of the coastal state; if the captain
of the vessel or the consul of the flag state requests the
coastal state for assistance, and if such exercise of juris-
diction is necessary to stop illicit traffic in drugs. 119
Under international law a foreign warship is always
considered to be a floating portion of the flag state, similar
to a diplomatic mission, even though in foreign waters and
never may she become subject to a coastal state's jurisdiction.
Nor may an official of the littoral state board her without
special permission. 12 ° crimes committed on board the vessel
by persons in the service of the vessel are subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state of the vessel. Even
if a citizen of the littoral state commits a crime aboard the
vessel, the flag state of the vessel may require he be brought
to the flag state for prosecution. 1 ^ 1
On the other hand
. . . unless special international
agreements, or special treaties between the flalj state
and the littoral state, provide to the contrary in
regard to a particular port or to certain territorial
waters, a State is, in strict law, always competent
to exclude men-of-war from all or certain of its ports,
and, according to some, from those territorial waters
which do not serve as highways for international
traffic. 12 2
119U.S. Naval War College, supra note 32, at 199, art. 19(1 ).
120Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 853-885. See
also J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (6th ed., 1963), p. 267
et seq
.
121* xOppenheim-Lauterpacht, op_. cit






The Convention adopted these international rules regard-
ing warships, but in recognition of the limited extraterri-
toriality of these vessels provided a single sanction, as
recognized by international law in Article 23:
If any warship does not comply with the regulations
of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea and disregards any request for com-
pliance which is made to it, the coastal State may
require the warship to leave the territorial sea.J-2 ^
D. Limited State Claims to Jurisdiction
Beyond the Territorial Waters
—
Contiguous Zones
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone recognizes the latter and defines it in Article 24 as "a
zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea
. . .
/which/ may not extend beyond twelve miles from the base line
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. "124
In this area the coastal state is authorized to exercise
control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitation regulations within its terri-
tory or its territorial sea and to punish those who are
responsible for the infringement of such regulations while
within its territory or its territorial sea. 12 5
The policy of the United States has been that there is
a protective jurisdiction which extends beyond the territorial
sea for limited purposes,which is necessary to effectively
1 0"\
U.S. Naval War College, supra note 32, at 200.
124 125





enforce the coastal state's territorial sovereignty. The
distance has been measured in miles, sailing time, and other
methods. 126 Great Britain and other states have similar pro-
visions. 12 ^ Such assertions to jurisdiction over the area
beyond the territorial sea have been most common in sanitation
and customs regulations.
As early as 1799 the United States adopted revenue laws
which extended its jurisdiction on the high seas to acts
committed within four marine leagues of its coasts. 12a During
its Prohibition Era, the United States claimed the righttto
stop, search, and deize foreign vessels suspected of smuggling
alcoholic beverages into the country although they were beyond
four marine leagues from the coast, in order to effectuate the
Volstead Act. 129 since ships were often stopped even though
they were not bouod for ports within the United States, many
states strongly objected. Ultimately, treaties were concluded
with many states which cofeeratied seizure of vessels within
But see Dickenson, Jurisdiction at the Maritime Fron-
tier , 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1 at 13 (1926) where it was argued that
a distance measurement alone is for many purposes impractical
in delimitation of the territorial sea.
127Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 495 & 496.
128 1 Stat. 627, 647, 700 (1799).
42 Stat. 858, 581 et seq . (1922), The Tariff Act of
Sept. 21, 1922 .
18 ,88.' rod s.c:
mc no\sd







one hour sailing time from the United States coasts based on
the speed of the vessels seized. 130
Chief Justice Marshall, in 1804, enunciated the principle
that the right of self defense of a state's territory permitted
a state to exercise jurisdictional rights beyond the immediate
territory of the state. 131 In this case the seizure of an
American commercial vessel on the high seas by the Portuguese
authorities who were protecting the commercial interests of
their colony of Brazil was upheld by the United States Supreme
Court as a lawful exercise of jurisdiction under international
law. This was based on the theory of international law that
an unreasonable attempt at extraterritorial jurisdiction would
be evidenced by the objections of other nations and that any
exercise of defensive jurisdiction not objected to by other
states was permissible under the Law of Nations.
Although generally the maximum limit for customs regula-
tion, revenue laws, and claims for exclusive fishing rights
has been limited to twelve miles, the Anti-smuggling Act, passed
in 1934, authorizes the President of the United States to
establish temporary customs enforcement areas which can extend
130Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 498 & n. 3.
Treaties, Great Britain: Jan. 23, 1924; Norway: May 24,1924;
Japan: May 21, 1928.
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sixty-two miles from the coast. 1^2 Granted that such broad
extensions can only be exercised where "reasonable," but
the limited claim to jurisdiction is nevertheless extensive.
As an exercise of self-defense jurisdictional expansion,
the United States Department of Commerce has established Air
Defense Identification Zones which extend from the Atlantic,
Gulf, and Pacific coastlines of the United States over a
considerable expanse of the high seas. The depths of the
Zones are measured by two hours air cruising time from the
Nation's coasts. ^3 Aircraft approaching the coasts of the
United States are required to identify themselves. These
regulations technically apply only to aircraft, foreign and
domestic, intending to anter the United States. Nevertheless,
the United States is exercising real, though limited, juris-
diction well beyond the three-mile limit of territorial seas
which she claims under international law as the extent of
her sovereignty.
Because this is the area of the seas in which the United
States alleged that the Pueblo seizure occurred, it is rele-
vant to examine the United States claims beyond her terri-
torial seas. What is claimed as legitimate jurisdictional
exercise by one protagonist cannot properly be denied to the
1 1?
19 U.S.C., ss. 1701-1711. See Jessup, "Legality of
the Anti-Smuggling Act," 31 A.J.I.L. 101 (1937).






other. Although the United States ratified the 1958 Convention
without reservation, the laws extending Contiguous Zones beyond
the maximum limit of twelve miles remain on the books. On
the other hand, North Korea, which claims twelve miles as a
limit to her territorial seas, is not a signatory to this
Conventionland is not bound to limit her contiguous zones to
twelve miles from her coasts until such time as the Convention
is established as international law.

V THE CONTEXT OF THE CRISIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF NORTH KOREA
A. A State of War or Peace?
North Korea is a State in the classic sense. She is in
possession of fixed territory, containing a permanent popula-
tion, and she possesses a government which represents and
carries on state authority. This, of course, also applies to
South Korea. These artificial Republics, formed from the
areas of a once integral State along the boundaries of shared
occupation between the Soviets in the North and the Americans
in the South after the Second World War, reflected the economic
and political philosophies of their occupiers.^34
When the North Korean armies invaded South Korea, the
Security Council succeeded in passing a resolution to "furnish
such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to
repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and
security in the Area."135 The Soviet Union's boycott of that
134Baily, supra note 3, at 819.







Organization for refusing to unseat Nationalist China made
the passage of that resolution possible.
1. Legality of the United Nations' Actions in Korea .
Since the relationship between the United states and
North Korea began with the Korean War it is first necessary
to determine the legality of the United Nations* actions
in response to the North Korean invasion of June 24, 1950.
Article 27(3) of the United Nations Charter requires
that decisions of the Security Council other than those pro-
cedural be made by seven affirmative votes including the
concurring votes of the permanent members. 136 During the
critical months of June and July 1950 the Soviet Union, a
permanent member of the Security Council, had deliberately
absented herself from the Security Council with the intent of
destroying the capacity of that organization to function. •L3 ^
Professor Stone argues, not without effect, that due to
the nonconformity of the Council to the procedural rules of
L36L. M. Goodrich and E. Hambro, Charter of the United
Nations (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 2d Rev. ed. (1949),
p. 590.
137The Soviet Union declared that it would consider none
of the resolutions of the Security Council to have any force
or effect because two members of the Security Council were
absent, namely, the real representatives of China—those sent
by the government of Mao Tse-tung—and those of the Soviet
Union itself. See also M. S. McDougal, The Veto and the










the Charter it must be concluded that the "call" to cease fire
and the recommendatory resolution of the Security Council of
June 27, 1950^8 asking the United Nations membership to con-
tribute "such assistance to repel the armed attack and to
restore international peace and security in the area" were
ineffective as legal resolutions .139 jje continues by pointing
out that Articles 43 and 45 of the Charter^40 under which the
Security Council acted could not be binding as a decision
since those articles depended on special agreements between
the individual members of the United Nations regarding the
availability of armed forces and such agreements had not as
yet been concluded. For this reason, explains Stone, the




Professor Stone, however, fails to consider Article 106
of the Charterl42 which requires that the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council consult and take joint action as
138L. B. Sohn, United Nations Law (Brooklyn Foundation
Press, Inc., 2d ed., 1967), p. 480.
139
J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict
(Sydney: Maitland Publications Pty., Ltd., 1954), p. 231
et se^ .
140Goodrich and Hambro, 3upra note 136, pp. 281-89.
J. Stone, op. cit
. , p. 233, n. 29.
Goodrich and Hambro, supra note 136, p. 530 <srt seq .
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necessary so that Chapter VII of the Charter, concerning action
to be taken in regard to threats to the peace, might be
effectively implemented pending the working out of the special
agreements. The Soviet Union's failure to conform to Article
106 of the Charter would hardly prevent joint action ounder
that article by the o J> her members who desired to fulfill
their obligations to the United Nations,
Nevertheless, the allegation by the Soviet Union's dele-
gation to the Security Council that Article 27(3), strictly
and properly interpreted, prevents the Security Council from
functioning in the absence of one of the permanent members
was effectively answered by the United Kingdom representative
to the Security Council:
(T)o maintain that the Security Council must be
powerless because one member in a fit of pique
simply bc^CDtts it, is really to admit that the
Security Council, and indeed the whole of the
United Nations, can function only if it functions
in accordance with the wish, and even the behest,
of one individual permanent member. ... I cannot
conceive that any rational human being would admit
that the theory ought to be abused in such a way
as this, more especially since all the great
Powers
. . . have entered into a solemn obligation
to abide by the purposes and the principles of the
Charter. . . .143
The dispute of whether the Security Council could function
when a permanent member of that body was absent in light of
Article 27(3) was significant not only regarding the Korean







Resolutions' legality but for the existence of the United
Nations itself. Professor Gross of Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy and Professor McDougal of Yale University wrote
articles supporting the restrictive and expansive interpreta-
tions respectively. As Professor McDougal points out in his
article, the practice of the United Nations, together with the
fact that the Charter is a constitutional instrument which
will evolve in time to merely a framework for the functioning
of the United Nations, cannot be given a restrictive interpre-
tation, especially when it does not conform with that body's
144 See L. Gross, Voting in the S curity Council ;
Abstention from and Absence from Meetings , 60 Yale L.J. 209
(1951), where he said that the framers of the Charter made an
error in the unanimity rule but it has to be lived with. For
if absence is no more than abstention, then the Council can
function if four of the five permanent members are absent
from the Security Council meeting, and certainly the framers
did not intend this. For these and other reasons determined
that Article 27(3) of the Charter could only be read as para-
lyzing the Security Council if a permanent member was absent.
See also MCDou§al, supra note 137, p. 258. This article
begins by pointing out that Article 27(3) of the Charter
does not read "all five" permanent members "who must be present
and voting." Further, Professor McDougal argues that words
do not have clear meanings of themselves but that they must
be given a rational meaning within the framework of their
purpose. Beyond this the practice of the Body demonstrated
that absence was considered an abstention to the point that
Goodrich & Hambro in their work on the United Nations, which
was sanctioned by that Organization, reached this conclusion
prior to the Soviet walkout of January 1950. For these and
other reasons the professor believes that the absence of a
permanent member will not force the Security Council's






practice. The only rational result appears to be the recog-
nition of the voluntary absence of a permanent member of the
Security Council as an abandonment of his prerogatives and
privileges, thereby permitting that body to function in face
of such an absence. The actions of the Security Council and
the General Assembly attest to this interpretation of the
Charter, not only demonstrating that such an absence will not
prevent the Security Council from functioning but confirming
that the resolutions of that United Nations Organ after North
Korea's invasion of the South were legally binding as well.
2. The Status of the United States Relative to its Position
in the Korean Conflict.
The Korean conflict, although officially a "Unified
Command" under the United Nations Flag, maintaining peace and
security of the world, was, in the words of one author:
in effect, chiefly an American enterprise
. . .
its
political direction was dominated chiefly by the
United States. In fact, if it had not been for Amer-
ican initiative the international police force in
Korea would not have come into existence at all. 145
If the United States is in law one of the belligerents in the
Korean conflict, and that conflict can be classified as a war,
it could be argued that the seizure of the Pueblo was North
Korea's privilege as a belligerent in time of war depending,
of course, upon the effect of the Armistice. For, in time of
145
J. G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations (New York





war enemy warships can be attacked on sight and either
captured or destroyed.
^
4° The real significance of the United
States status is obvious. For if the United States was and
remains in a belligerent status relative to the People's
Democratic Republic of North Korea and vice versa since the
signing of the Armistice Agreement, then the seizure of the
Pueblo would be a legal act of belligerency under international
law, leaving the United States no recourse to act, and the
matter would be closed. Therefore, the legality of any posi-
tive action or choice to take positive action against North
Korea after that Sfcate seized the Pueblo is dependent upon
the United States as a State, separate and distinct from its
relationship with North Korea through the United Nations during
the Korean War, being freed from a status of belligerency as
to North Korea under customary international law.
The resolution of the Security Council on July 7, 1950
recommended to all Members of the United Nations acting pur-
suant to earlier Security Council resolutions in providing
troops and other assistance that they aake suchassistance
available to the Unified Command under the direction of the
United States; requested the United States to designate a
commander for the Command; and authorized the use of the
146
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United Nations flag in the course of operations against
North Korea. 147
Although the United States did supply about 90 percent of
the manpower and material used in the police action, fifteen
member states other than the United States and South Korea con-
tributed troops and thirty-seven other members offered to
contribute a wide range of supplies and services. 148 The United
Nations never considered the hostilities in Korea as an American
effort. Both the members of that Organization and the United
States Government in particular considered their contributions
of men and materials as part of a United Nations effort to
maintain international peace and security. 149 President Truman
declared that the United States was not at war at the inception
of the fighting. 1^0 officially, this position was maintained
throughout the conflict. The United States Government refused
to accept protests addressed to it by the Soviet Union and Red
China based on the alleged illegal acts of the American forces
in Korea. The United States claimed that the action was a
United Nations effort and so insisted that cmmplaints go to
the Secretary General of the United Nations. 151 In addition to
147Sohn, supra note 138, p. 481.
148Stoessinger, supra note 145, pp. 367-68.
Sohn, supra note 138, p. 510 et seq .
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N.Y. Times , June 30, 1950, at 1, col. 5.
151
H. Lauterpacht, "The Limits of the Operation of the










the foregoing, the preponderance of United States assistance
is understandable considering its position as a world power
and its ability to accomplish the goals desired by the United
Nations, whose very existence depended upon the success of its
Korean enterprise.
Therefore, the status of the United States, as well as
that of the other nations participating in this initial attempt
to prevent aggression through the machinery of the United
Nations, was not that of a belligerent at war with North Korea
in the classic sense. The "belligerency" as it existed would
be first between the North Korean "state" and the United
Nations as participants in the world order process, and only
shared by those states serving in the Unified Command as
members thereof.
3. The Juridical Character of the United Nations .
Action in Korea ;
The Korean conflict is difficult to classify within the
traditional concepts of international law. Although Korea was
looked upon as a single state temporarily divided by all par-
ties interested in the conflict, the conflict was not a civil
war/" The Soviet Union insisted that the dispute in Korea
was an internal affair and not within the competence of the
United Hattorus. m fact, the attitude of the proponents of
152P.B. Potter, " Legal Aspects of the Situation in
Korea," 44 A.J.I. L. 709 (1950).
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both sides was that the Korea recognized by the other was a
puppet regime rather than a regime representing the people.
Both North Korea and South Korea possessed a constituted
government, a fixed population, and a territorial delimita-
tion. The North Korean declaration of war on South Korea is
not consistent with its being classified as a civil war. It
isddifficult to deny that the events after World War II pro-
duced a people divided into two states, and the concern regard-
ing which government was legitimate is a question of recognition.
There was in fact a war between states when North Korea invaded
the South. Tfee classic definition of war could be applied to
the fighting between the two Korean governments in that the
three basic elements were present i a hostile content ipn; by
means of armed forces; carried on between states. 153 Neverthe-
less, the Korean police action by the United Nations forces was
not referred to as "war" in the legal sense of the term by the
United Nations or by individual members of the United Nations. 154
The United States recognized only the South Korean Government
because it alone had conformed with the Resolution of the Gen-
eral Assembly of November 14, 1947 regarding free elections. 155
153Dept. of Army Pamph. 27-161-2, 2 International Law 27
(1962).
l^Lauterpacht, supra note 151. See also P.C. Jessup,
"Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status
between Peace and War"? 48 A.J.I. L. 98 (1954).








Thus, the United Nations enforcement action was considered at
most a limited war of international character to maintain
international peace and security and prevent the defiance of
the United Nations by North Korea. Both sides acknowledged
the applicability of the International Law of War and the
Geneva Conventions of 1949.156 The conduct of the conflict was
confined to the Korean Peninsula. Neither side declared war
on the other^-57 save North Korea's original declaration against
the South. Although the Soviet Union and Communist China
clandestinely assisted North Korea with arms and, finally, as
the United Nations Command approached the Sino-Korean bound-
ary, with Chinese "volunteers," neither ventured to challenge
overtly the Unified Command in spite of their claims that the
United Nations efforts were illegal. The goals of the action
and the war zone remained limited and localized throughout the
confrontation and for the two years of armistice talks.
4. The Legal Status Created by the Korean Armistice .
Since neither side succeeded in forcing its will upon the
other short of a greatly expanded war effort, and since peace
was impossible since by definition that would require a per-
manently divided Korea, an armistice was signed on July 27, 1953
An armistice is the cessation of active hostilities for
1
^"Lauterpacht, supra note 151, at 223.
157
Stone, supra note 139, at 310.
-
64
a period agreed upon by the belligerents. It is not a partial
or a temporary peace. 158
In the past, armistices were resorted to for administra-
tive and related purposes until a treaty of peace could be
concluded to formally end the state of war, and the terms were
usually dictated from one side to the other. 159IIn Korea, this
changed. The terms were limited to cessation of military
operations and repatriation of prisoners $ together with the
creation of machinery to enforce the provisions of the agree-
ment.
The Preamble of the Korean Armistice Agreement declares
its authors' purposes to be:
... in the interest of stopping the Korean
conflict, . . . establishing an armistice to
assure a complete cessation of hostilities
and of all acts of armed force in Korea until
a final peace settlement is achieved . . .
said conditions and terms are intended to be
purely military in character and to pertain
solely to the belligerents in Korea. 160
J-58General Armistices are usually of a combined political
and military character. They usually precede negotiations for
peace. A general armistice is normally concluded by senior
military officers or by diplomatic representatives. See DBJVtt
.
of Army Field Manual, FM 27-10, ' fhe Law of Land Warfare , s.
483 (1956).
159M.W. Graham, "Armistices 1944 Style," 39 A.J.I.L.
286 (1945).




Does the Korean Armistice, which normally does not end a state
of war but only stops hostilities, within the framework of
the Korean situation in effect become more than an armistice
and actually bring a termination to the war as well?
Traditionally, the most common means to terminate a state
of war, setting aside the newer concept of a limited war, is
by a treaty of peace between the belligerents. This is usually
accompanied in more recent times by a complete subjugation of
one of the belligerent powers to the other and a virtual des-
truction of its political existence. 1^1 a treaty of peace is
not the sole means of terminating a state of war, and at times
it is diplomatically disadvantageous. Termination of a state
of war is a political act, and so must be established through
the political arm of the state governments involved. 162
An armistice, however, has not been recognized as a
method of bringing a legal state of war to an end. Although
161W.W. Bishop, International Law - Cases and Materials
(2d ed., 1962), p. 785.
162The United States, for instance, can end a state of
war by legislation as it did with Germany after World War I,
or by presidential Proclamation as it did with Germany after
World War II. The First World War was terminated by Joint
Resolution of Congress on July 2, 1921 (42 Stat. 105) and on
October 24, 1951 President Truman issued a Proclamation
declaring the state of war between Germany and the United
States terminated, based on House Joint Resolution 289 of






when accompanied by a cessation of hostilities and a
withdrawal of enemy forces and where both parties indicate
that the war is over, the armistice, given time, may ripen
into a legal end to a state of war. 163 It ^as become increas-
ingly evident in modern times that there must exist in fact,
if not in law, a middle ground—a factual continuam—between
peace and war. A number of publicists have referred to the
impracticalities of international law in requiring a treaty
of peace to conclude a state of war when in fact they are
years in the making. ^ These authors see a modern trend to
regard general armistice as not merely a germination of
hostilities, but as a de facto termination of war.
This is especially true in the Korean Situation. The
Armistice provided a status quo ante bellum . It solved none
of the problems which caused the war in the first place. Both
sides were intact as neither was capable of destroying the
other within the scope of a limited war since the United States
by its policy decided not to use nuclear weapons. The net
result of three years of bloodshed was the loss to the North
Korean Government of 1,500 square miles of territory . *-^5
163Bishop, supra note 161, £1 785.
164Stone, supra note 139, pt 646. See also 10 Whiteman'
s




Legal Ftate of the
Korean Hostilities," 45 Geo. L.J. 45 (1956).





Akin to this is the fact that there never was a state
of war recognized between the United Nations forces and the
North Korean and Chinese "volunteer" forces. As there was no
formal beginning of a state of war it can be logically accepted
that no formal treaty of peace is necessary. This is not true
between the Koreans themselves. But even here an armistice
might be considered adequate. The lack of political and
economic intercourse between the two sections of Korea has been
in existence for so long that the continuation of a legal state
of war between them will not hurt trade relations and the like.
Both sides are determined to reunite the Peninsula as they were
prior to the Korean conflict, and so a treaty of peace is im-
possible.
Therefore, the armistice between the participants in
Korea becomes tantamount to a permanent end to the hostilities
as they existed after the North Korean invasion of June 1950.
Even though the Armistice was limited to military matters
still it qualifier as a general armistice , for political matters
remained as they existed prior to the hostilities.
Between July 1953, when the Armistice came into effect,
and January 1968, the time of the seizure of the Pueblo , the
Armistice had remained the only document to demonstrate the end
of active hostilities. During that time, as already noted,
numerous "serious" violations of the Armistice were recorded
on both sides, although the worst incidents were caused by the









North Korea. The Hague Regulations of 1907 provide:
Any serious violation of the Armistice by one of
the parties gives the other party the right of
denouncing it, and even, in cases of urgency, of
recommencing hostilities immediately.
Were the Armistice considered to be no more than a temporary
cessation of hostilities, the United Nations command could
have denounced the Armistice or even resumed hostilities.
This is also true of North Korea. Neither side has so much
as considered this a proper course of action. The Korean
Armistice has been treated as though it is something more
than a temporary end to hostilities. The de facto state of
war in Korea has, by the Armistice, become a de facto termin-
ation of wary.
B. A Legal Analysis of the Claims surrounding
the Seizure of the Pueblo
It is best to examine the arguments of each side as
though the writer were an advocate for the other protagonist
in the dispute, as it points up the inadequacies of the world
order system, as it exists today, in dealing with the situation.
First, the immediate claims of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea must be considered. These are two: That the Pueblo
was a "spy ship" sent by the United States and that it intru-
ded into North Korea's territorial seas, thereby creating
serious provocation. Secondly, an inquiry will be made into the
counterclaims of the United States that the seizure was an act
166
















of piracy and that the seizure was illegal per se as uncoun-
tenanced by international law. Last, the acts of both sides
will be examined as "aggression" to demonstrate that in many
respects the efforts of the world to outlaw aggression not only
have failed in their purpose, but could serve to produce a war
where both sides insist that it was the "aggression" of the
other that required it to fight a defensive war.
1. The Korean Claims .
The Pueblo was an "armed spy ship" of the United states ;
Article 29 of the Hague Regulations defines a spy as
(1) a person who (2) acting clandestinely or on false preten-
ses (3) obtains or endeavors to obtain information (4) in the
zone of operations of a belligerent with the intention of
communicating it to the hostile party. 167
This definition provides for spying in time of war rather
than peace, and so the relevance of the Armistice becomes impor-
tant. The Armistice effectively ended the state of war, for
if it did not the North Koreans could have claimed that the
hostilities still existed and thus the seizure of the Pueblo
was legal under the laws of war. Even in peace, however, spy-
ing is pursued. Lauterpacht calls spies "Agents without
167Deptt. Army Pamph., supra note 153, at 57.
168H.S. Levie, "The Nature and Scope of the Armistice
Agreement," 50 A.J.I.L. 880 at 904 (1956). During a General
Armistice belligerents appear to retain the right to capture












Diplomatic or Consular Character. "I69 They are secret agents
of a state sent abroad to acquire military or political
secrets. They are sent clandestinely and although such activ-
ity is not considered illegal or immoral, spies, if caught,
are subject to the municipal law of the capturing state unless
they possess a cloak of diplomatic immunity. 170
A spy may be a member of the armed forces, but he must
act surreptitiously or under false pretenses to be treated as
a spy. 171 The pueblo itself was not disguised, it is conceiv-
able that the claimed purpose of the United States that the
vessel was acquiring hydrographic data and radio waves when
in addition she was recording and analyzing a much broader
scope of information could imply that the vessel was acting
under false pretenses. This, however, is stretching the
meaning of "false pretense" too far D Both participants were
aware of the nationality and the status of the vessel. Its
purpose was known to both parties as that of gathering infor-
mation. Therefore, the personnel, being clearly within the
definition of naval forces, could not be tried as spies under
any proper definition of the term.
-"-^Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 859 & 862.
170M.






Consequently, even if the vessel encroached into the
territorial seas of North Korea in time of war, the personnel
aboard the vessel must be given the status of prisoners of war.
In time of peace the vessel cannot be seized, as it is a fore-
eign man-of-war. It is illegal to place the personnel aboard
the Pueblo in the status of spies and bring them before a local
court for adjudication. The current regime of territorial seas
does not provide the adjacent state with authority to capture
and charge crew members of foreign men-of-war for spying.
Claims that the Vessel Violated the Territorial
Waters of North Korea;
On the face of the dispute international law is clear.
A foreign man9of-war is immune from seizure not only in inter-
national waters but within the territorial seas of states as
well. Unless the status of the parties is that of belligerents
it ia difficult to justify the seizure of a foreign man-of-war
at all . If it were to be tolerated as absolutely necessary, a
seizure should be the means of last resort. Had the North
Korean authorities issued official warnings to the United States
Government either through the Military Armistice Commission at
Panmunjora or through some mutually recognized power, then pro-
ceeded to drive out encroaching United States men-of-war, the
seizure of the Pueblo would acquire a guise, at least, of neces-
sity. Should these efforts fail to stop United States encroach-
ment, then a seizure might be tolerated as the only sanction











regarding intelligence-gathering vessels, there can be no
justification in the North Korean claim that the Pueblo
violated its territorial seas. There is no concrete evidence
that the Pueblo was ever closer than thirteen miles to the
shores of North Korea. 172 The United States offered the evi-
dence it had. The North Korean authorities, who had the ship's
logs and record^, offered only confessions of crew members
for proof of the encroachment.
2. United States Counterclaims
The Seizure as Piracy ;
Piracy in its strictest meaning is every unauthorized
act of violence committed by a private vessel on the open sea
against another vessel, with the intent to plunder. 173 However,
it can be argued that the concept of piracy has been extended
from its intended meaning and that it now applies to all ruth-
less acts of lawlessness on the high seas by whomsoever com-
mitted. 174 Nevertheless, this seizure cannot be classified as
piracy for a number of reasons.
172Soviet intelligence-gathering vessels regularly take
station in South Korean waters, the waters off the coast of
Viet-Nam, and near the United States airbase in Guam. They
are likewise stationed off the harbors of San Francisco and
Charleston, South Carolina, observing the movement of the nuclear
submarines of the United States Navy, They remain beyond the
tertitorial seas of the United States. See N.Y. Times , Jan. 25,
1968, at 14, col. 8.
















Piracy can be committed on the open seas and in situa-
tions where the attack was from the open seas, under customary
international law. 175 if the facts prove that the vessel was
seized in North Korean territorial waters it must be shown
that the seizure resulted from a descent upon the Pueblo from
the open seas. Should this be successfully demonstrated the
argument remains untenable unless it can be shown that the
actions and intent of the North Koreans were piratical and
without governmental authority, since only under such circum-
stances can a man-of-war be designated a pirate vessel.
The North Korean patrol vessels which seized the Pueblo
undoubtedly had the support of their government. Those ves-
sels were readily recognizable as men-of-war. These facts
were demonstrated by the events subsequent to the seizure.
As they were men-of-war, the maximum redress possible under
international law, assuming there were unjustified acts of
violence, would appear to require a form of redress from the
flag state. 176
Moreover, the Convention on the High Seas of 1958, to
which the United States is a party, further limits the applica-
tion of the term "piracy." Acts of violence constituting piracy
can only be attributed to warships whose crew has mutinied and
controls the vessel to which those deeds are attributed. 177
i750ppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 615
i
176 Id. ,at 610
177
Befl. Naval War College, supra note 32 at 207, art. lu.






There is no evidence that a charge of piracy could be success-
fully applied to the North Korean patrol vessels or their
crews
.
The Counterclaim that the Seizure of the Pueblo was
Illegal per se as a Matter of International Law;
Traditionallinternational law grants warships an extra-
territoriality as floating portions of their flag states and
as such entitles them to immunity from the jurisdiction of
any state, not only on the high seas but in foreign territorial
waters as well. 178 This immunity even extends to foreign
ports.
*
79 Under currently applicable international law the
warships of all nations are entitled to navigate the open seas
without interference from any other state. This even extends
to naval vessels engaged in intelligence-gathering activities. 1^0
North Korea apparently does not dispute this right on
the open seas since her communiques claim that the Pueblo was
within her territorial seas and remained there after repeated
178Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 282, 461,
& 852-55. See also Svarlien, 3upra note 82 at 195, & Colombos,
supra note 82, at 196.
179The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 cranch)
116 (1812). The United States Supreme Court held that as a
matter of international law a state must give complete immu-
nity to visiting foreign warships. McDougal and Burke, supra
note 53, at 135 state: o well established is this consensus
that modern attempts to interfere with warships in foreign
ports are virtually non-existent. ..."
180The United States recognizes the right of the
intelligence-gathering vessels of the Soviet Union to navi-















requests to leave. This was the apparent basis for her act
of seizure.
In time of war, capture and seizure of a belligerent's
men-of-war is permissible.
I
8* As the North Korean authorities
failed to refer to this at all, it could be argued that they
did not consider a state of war to be in existence. This is
further bolstered in their threats to treat the officers and
crew of the Pueblo as spies. This would not be consistent for
in a case of belligerency they must be considered as prisoners
of war. 182
At times other than wartime coastal states have the
right to request that a foreign warship leave its territorial
sea and complain to the vessel's flag state if the war vessel
refuses to comply wherever the vessel has violated or continues
to violate the coastal state's regulations. The coastal state
can even forcefully compel the foreign war vessel to depart
its jurisdiction.
I
8 ** Nevertheless, it is a fundamental rule
that warships cannot form the object of a seizure, arrest, or
^°*U.S. Naval War College, supra note 146, p. 56. See
also p. 397, Law of Naval Warfare, art. 503(a)(2): "Enemy
warships and military aircraft may be captured outside neutral
jurisdiction. Prize procedure is not used for such captured
vessels and aircraft because their ownership immediately vests
in the captors' government by the fact of the capture."
182 Id., p. 399, art. 511(a).
*-°^Colombos, supra note 92, pp. 194 & 196, & Oppenheim-
Lauterpacht, supra note 51, pp. 854-55.
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detention by any legal means whatsoever or by any judicial
process
o
184 Therefore the law is clear and North Korea's
seizure of the Pueblo is illegal per se and constitutes a
grave breach of international law.
Yet North Korea can argue successfully that she had a
legal right to seize the vessel. Her propaganda implied her
case under the Armistice at the time of the seizure although,
possibly due to an inadequate forum, she never presented an
adequate legal defense.
Assuming that the Armistice was not a de facto termination
of hostilities but rather a general armistice agreement in the
classic sense, seizure of the belligerent's man-of-war is
probably permissible under international law, even during the
period that the armistice is in force. ^^^ Of course, if the
United States intelligence-gathering activities are completely
independent of United States activities as part of the United
Nations Unified Command, the United States might not qualify
as a belligerent. Much depends on the nature of the United
States position.
On the other hand, granting that the Korean Armistice is
an actual termination of the de facto war, as I believe the
evidence indicates, the North Korean actions can still be
justified under the Armistice.
184Colombos, oj>. cit
. , p. 196.
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Article II, paragraph 12 of that Agreement requires that:
. . .
the Commanders of the opposing sides shall
order and enforce a complete cessation of all
hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under
their control including all /navaJL/ units. . . .186
Paragraph 15 of the same Article continues:
This Armistice shall apply to all opposing naval
forces, which naval forces shall respect the
waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and
to the land area of Korea under the military
control of the opposing side.
. .
.187
Were the Pueblo within the territorial seas of North Korea it
would appear that the Armistice agreement was violated. Con-
sider the broad language of this paragraph: "... shall apply
to all opposing naval forces. ..." This could be interpreted
to mean either all naval forces of the various countries par-
ticipating, as they are attached to the Unified Command. Or it
could refer to all the naval forces of all the participating
countries, whether or not they are under the Unified Command
or operating under orders directly from their governments. The
latter interpretation appears to be the better one, for all
hostilities were to cease. Thus the violation of the Armistice
agreement could justify the action taken by North Korea for
the extremity of the action must be measured against the gravity
of the provocation presented by that vessel's location and
activities.
1864 U.S. T.I. A. 239 (1953); l87Id. , at 243.











Granting for a moment that the Pueblo never entered North
Korean waters but at all times remained beyond the twelve-mile
limit, there is still justification for the seizure as a vio-
lation of the Armistice Agreement. Notice the words "shall
respect the waters contiguous to . . . the land area of Korea
... of the opposing side." The meaning is hardly explicit.
This resulted from a failure to agree on terms. The United
Nations Command recognized a maximum permissible breadth of
the maritime belt at three miles. North Korea would agree to
nothing less than twelve miles, and the Republic of Korea
maintained its "Rhee Line" which extends from 60 to 200 miles
from that country's coastlines. *-°*' This vagueness could resilt
in a claim by North Korea that its contiguous zones extend
beyond twelve miles under the Armistice Agreement.
Secondly, the North Koreans could argue that they have
contiguous security zones extending beyond twelve nautical miles
from their coasts. The United States itself has exercised such
broad limited- jurisdictional claims, and what is sauce for the
goode is sauce for the gander. The 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Seas and the Contiguous Zone, Article 24^®^ limits
the maximum contiguous zone to a claimed distance of twelve
miles from the base line used to measure the territorial seas
and also to purpose, security being not mentioned in permissible
188Levie, supra note 168, at 906.




uses. Since the 1958 Conventions are not established as
international law, only signatories to the Contentions are
bound by these limitations. The United States, but not North
Korea, is a signatory.
A third argument to justify the actions of North Korea
is the claim that the Pueblo encroached upon North Korean
territory—if not physically, then unquestionably by the in-
cursion of her radar and intelligence-gathering apparatus into
the airspace and sea space within her jurisdiction. Such
actions were cloeely akin to the actions of other ships which
hovered off the coasts of the United States although not bound
for United States ports, in order to deliver their illicit
liquid cargo in defiance of the laws of the United States.
This last argument is equally convincing without the
support given by the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Recall
the development of and the current status regarding the law of
the territorial seas and the contiguous zone briefly set out
in an earlier section of this paper. Although the navigation
of coastal seas by foreign men-of-war may be permitted (it is
doubtful that North Korea would have to accept this ashher seas
do not constitute an international strait), hovering within
foreign coastal seas of a state is nowhere in international law
condoned outside of emergency situations. Neither the Corfu
Channel Casennor the 1958 Convention could be extended to in-
corporate the toleration of the hovering of a foreign man-of-war
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within the territorial seas of a coastal state. This violation
of North Korea's quasi-sovereign territory requires that North
Korea have a legally justifiable alternative to prevent such
challenge to her integrity. I suggest at this point that
North Korea's actions are not unreasonable.
For the sake of argument, and to reduce the confusing
number of issues presented by the facts of this case, assume
that the Pueblo was hovering immediately outside the territorial
seas of North Korea and that she proceeded further to sea upon
being challenged by the North Korean patrol boats—where she
was captured. Assume further that the vessel was on a mission
totally unconnected with the Unified Command of North Korea,
thereby eliminating the difficulties presented by the clauses
of the Armistice Agreement. Assume further that the United
States can in no way be linked legally to the Korean hostilities
of the early fifties, so that North Korea cannot claim the
United States is a "hostile power" by reference to the United
Nations police action. The North Korean authorities still retain
a justification for their actions under the inherent right to
self defense. 190 Exactly how extensive this right is, especially
190See McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World
Public Order (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961), p. 174 et
seq
. , wherein consideration is given to the attempts to limit
the right of self-defense under the United Nations Charter to
discourage its indiscriminate use by potential aggressors and
yet maintain the right insofar as necessary to maintain and






in light of the United Nations Charter, requires serious
consideration. This will be considered below in more detail.
But, considering the difference in dize and power of the par-
ticipants in the Pueblo seizure, the relative threat to the
values of each state represented by the presence of the foreign
man-of-war, and the values each sought to protect by its activi-
ties, the North Korean authorities can support substantially
the claim that their actions were necessary to preserve their
territory from United States aggression.
C. Aggression, Self Defense, and the Pueblo
As the seizure of a foreign warship is not permitted under
international law, such an act could be 'Considered by the
victim state as an act of war. It is a clearly aggressive act
even where done under a defensive aspect. Today the world is
attempting to develop a world public order system which can
successfully cope with the crises situations which develop
between nations and peoples. Especially since World War I,
thelleading nations of the world believed it vital that warlike
acts be curtailed. Their efforts led to the establishment of
world diplomatic organizations and to attempts to define
"aggression" so that such acts could be quickly condemned and
the perpetrators punished.
In 1919, the League of Nations was created in the first,
although unsuccessful, attempt to prevent international wars
/ ano.. a a©-
82
as a means of settling disputes between countries. !91 The
Kellogg-Briand Pact192 (Pact of Paris) of 1928 specifidally
outlawed resort to war to solve international controversies
and bound the contracting parties to solve all international
disputes solely by pacific means. Among the original fifteen
signatories to the Pact were Germany, Japan, Italy, and the
U.S.S.R. 193
These noble attempts resulted in failure and World War
II only increased the desire for a permanent end to war on the
part of the nations of the world. The United Nations Charter
represented a renewed attempt to create a multinational forum
in the continued belief that such a body is needed to cultivate
friendly relations among states. The purposes of this organi-
zation are among others: (1) to maintain international peace
and security; prevent and remove threats to the peace; suppres-
sion of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace; (2)
to bring about by peaceful means adjustment and settlement of
international disputes; (3) to develop friendly relations among
191The Covenant of the Leage of Nations began: "In order
to promote international cooperation and to achieve international
peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort
to war, ..." See L.B. Sohn, Basic Documents of the United
Nations (Brooklyn: Foundation Press (2d Ed., 1963), p. 295.
19246 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
193







nations, and (4) to solve economic, social, and other problems
through international cooperation. 194
In pursuit of these goals Article 2(4) of the Charter
requires that:
All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations. 195
Article 51 of the Charter balances this restriction on the
use of arms by recognizing the need for self-defense.
Nothing in this Charter shall impair the inherent
right of indiviual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations. 196
The United Nations Charter was framed so as to deliber-
ately avoid the term "war" as well as a specific definition
of 'aggression, " although it clearly attempted to provide ade-
quate sanctions against the possibility of future armed
hostilities. 197 Since the United Nations began to function
repeated attempts have been made to adopt a specific defini-
tion which would include all actions constituting aggression.
This has yet to be accomplished. On one side of the debate
are those states which want aggression defined because they
believe that the use of effective sanctions would be enhanced
194United Nations Charter, Artw 1.
195Sohn, supra note 191, p. 2j Id., p. 12.





and that the would-be aggressors could more easily be iden-
tified, thereby discouraging all forms of direct and indirect
aggression. Other states, including the United States, consider
that attempts at a sufficiently comprehensive definition of
"aggression" are futile and that anything less in scope would
be harmful since it would curtail the ability of the United
Nations to respond to threats to the peace by virtue of the
definition, while potential aggressors, having the adopted
definition before them, could insure no United Nations inter-
ference by limiting their aggressive hostilities to activities
beyond the scope of the definition. ^98
The United States fears that an officially adopted
definition would create a burden on the Organization with which
it might be unable to cope, since it is already limited in its
responsive capacities through the need for permanent member
agreement in the Security Council. The difficulties are fur-
ther increased by the fact that frequently aggression is
claimed to be merely the exercise of the right of self-defense
by the nations engaging in the armed hostilities. The Soviet
Union proposed a listing of examples of direct aggression and
included such factors as the State which first declares war
against another state, or invades, bombards, or lands troops
therein without permission; engages in Naval Blockade or
supports armed bands which engage in attacks on a nearby state.
n. 149.





The Soviet definition also includes forms of indirect aggres-
sion such as encouraging subversive activities or promoting
civil war, and gives examples of economic and ideological
aggression.^99 The Soviet definition could result in labelling
the United States attempts at containing Communism as aggression*
requiring an embarrassing loss of face for the United States
if embraced by the United Nations. 200 This would give an open
door to Communist expansionist activities in the form of "wars
of national liberation" which, due to the clandestine activities
of the communist states not Members of the United Nations, could
not be successfully labelled as aggression or dealt with either
by the United Nations or by the United States under the theory
of collective self-defense. In fche present world order system
it is to the advantage of the free world that no definition of
aggression has been forthcoming, for the hands of the free world
would be tied in the face of an imperialistic philosophy known
as Communism.
Since a definition has yet to be agreed upon, the deter-
mination of what constitutes an aggressive act remains a sub-
jective test. Each nation applies the term as it finds useful
and appropriate to justify its own actions and condemn the acts
of other states before the world.
199
•R.V. Hansen, "Defining Aggression - United States






Perhaps the most workable definition of "aggression,"
suggested by Professor McDougal, is that form of uninvited
interference which is directed by one state or group of states,
either by the direct participation of or with the encouragement
or support of its officials, against another state or group
of states in a manner directly destructive of the basic values
of the target state or the world at large. 201 This definition
provides a workable frame of reference in which to consider
the Pueblo Incident as it is,with violent, as opposed to peace-
ful, means of persuasion by which the North Korean goals were
accomplished
.
The use of armed force is permitted, under the Charter,
in two situations which cannot be labelled as ?aggression,
"
and therefore can legally be usedj action taken by the Security
Council or, if necessary, by the members of the United Nations
separately under General Assembly action pursuant to the
"Uniting for Peace" Resolution of 1950, to maintain internat-
ional peace and security or prevent a threat to the peace, and
by states individually or collectively, under the inherent right
of self-defense. Armed enforcement actions under the United
Nations Charter are not applicable to the coercion situation
created by the Pueblo Incident, nor do they present difficult
legal questions in themselves for such action is not classified




as aggression by rational decisionmakers nor is such action
pursuant to anUnited States determination challenged covertly
by Members of that Organization, for world opinion will aknost
unanimously support a United Nations decision. It is outside
of that Organization that difficult issues arise when both
sides claim that they are engaging in an action of self-
defense while their enemy is the aggressor. The concept of
self-defense must be examined as both participants claim that
self-defense was the motive for their actions—which led to a
world crisis on January 23, 1968.
The right of self-defense under general inter-
national law is as vague as it is unquestioned,
and as liable to abuse in its application as it
is indispensible in the present phase of the
international society. 202
The claim of self-defense is most conspicuous when it
is used in response to a violent and substantial military attack
initiated against it, such as the response of the United States
to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, by the armed forces of
the Japanese Empire in December 1941. Less obvious and more
difficult to assess are claims of self-defense where one par-
ticipant attacks another to prevent an anticipated attack by
him. This was the claim of the Israeli Government when it
initiated the actual armed warfare against its neighbors in
June 1967. The difficulty here is that the attacking state is








making a value judgment that may or may not be accurate and,
regardless of the truth, the various states in the world
arena will support their ally against their (and his) enemy.
This response by allied states prevents, frequently for long
periods of time if not permanently, an adequate or timely
appraisal of the situation by a neutral body. A third type
of assertion of self-defense is coercion against third states,
even a non-participant in the original conflict, by one
belligerent in order to prevent injury through the assistance,
either intentional or inadvertent, by that third state which
could allegedly cause grave injury to the state using coercion.
The British destruction of the French Fleet in the Mefliterranean
in 1940 after the German victories in Western Europe, to pre-
vent Germany from acquiring it, serves as an example. This
type too requires self-determination, and is thereby subject
to dispute as to who is the aggressor and who is the defender.
These claims are frequently asserted as self-defense or self-
preservation or necessity. None of them, except perhaps for
the fir st, are actually a response to a threat against inde-
pendence or to territorial integrity of the acting state. 203
The right of self-defense requires that the action taken
203McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 190, p. 209 et.
seq
.
See also W.T. Mallison, Jr., "Limited Naval Blockade
or Quarantine Interdiction: National and Collective Defense









be necessary and in proportion to the threat facing the
participant claiming the right. To analyze the problem at
hand the variables recommended by Professor McDouglal will be
used20^ to answer the issues presented by the Pueblo-North
Korean coercive situation, namely, an examination of the par-
ticipants, their objectives, methods, conditions, and effects
in order to determine whether the current international public
order system can solve the dispute and, if not, what is
required.
D. The Parties to the Incident in the
Light of the Situation
1. The Participants .
1 1 is first necessary to identify the participants in
order that the dispute may have focus. Immediately involved
are two: the united States of America and the People's
Democratic Republic of Korea. On the next level are the
U.S.S.R., the Republic of Korea, and the United Nations. These
latter are interested incidentally and participate not as
immediate decision-makers in the seizure, but as interested
observers and potential actors in the conflict. The U.S.S.R.
created the North Korean Government and maintained that the
Korean "war" was an internal matter involving Korea at the time
the Republic of Korea was invaded. 205 Secondly, the Soviet Union,
204McDougal and Feliciano, op . cit
. , p. 220 et seg .
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as a state which utilizes intelligence-gathering vessels,
will be interested in observing the United States reaction
as an experience she herself could suffer as a similar embar-
rassment, 206 Thirdly, as an ally and protector of North Korea,
an enlarged conflict could draw the Soviets into the dispute.
The United Nations is virtually always involved in such
crises as that Organization is responsible for the maintenance
of international peace and security. A special interest exists
in this case because of the United Nations previous and con-
tinuing commitment to South Korea which, if not a universally
recognized state* is # at least, a distinct and relatively
permanent territorial unit which that Organization is obliged
to defend. 207
The Republic of Korea relies upon the United States for
guidance and protection against the enemy government of the
North. She seas the seizure of the Pueblo as a test of the
strength and courage of her defender, without whom she would
206N.Y. Times , June 12, 1968, at 6, col. 6. It was
reported that the Soviet intelligence vessel Kegostrov was
released by Brazil after the Soviet Union apologized and paid
an indemnity. The vessel was seized on May 4, 1968 or there-
abouts by the Brazilian Navy two miles off the coast of Brazil.
The vessel was released on May 24, 1968, about twenty days after
the seizure. The handling of this situation indicates that
the Soviets learned something from the United States experience.
This was handled quietly andswiftly. Russia did not make a
big show of it because the options opened only made the large
power look helpless. The Soviets paid the fine and let the
matter rest.
207McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 190, p. 221.
. :




probably not survive. She considers retaliation not as a
possible igniting force for a world conflagration, but rather
as a confirmation of her ally's loyalty.
The primary participants in this affair are the "owner"
and the "seizer" of the Pueblo , The United States is the
wealthiest and most powerful nation-state the world has known.
In the relatively short span of one hundred and fifty years
this country grew from a rebellious colony of Great Britain
to be twice the savior of Europe and the defender of the free
world. 208 The United States has always been linked to West
Europe and at least grew up in those international law tra-
ditions if not actually and at all times a participant and
contributor in its development. Therefore, the United States
could easily accept, adhere to, and even embrace international
law for it was conducive to an economy and social order com-
patible with that of the United States. Even the political
order was similar, as the President was akin to and enjoys
the powers of a monarch in the field of foreign affairs.
North Korea, on the other hand, is an aberrational state.
The Korean Peninsula was for centuries one state. World War
II and the subsequent occupation divided the country in the
center. The southern half of the Peninsula established a
government by free elections under the supervision of the
208See Bailey, supra note 3, for an interesting over-







United Nations. The northern half is ruled by a regime
created and imposed upon the people by the Soviet occupiers.
This "state" is recognized solely by the communist bloc of
nations. The great majority 6f the United Nations members
recognize the government of the Republic of Korea as the
only properly installed government of that Peninsula. This
Republic is a strong democracy, growing increasingly powerful.
The North depends on its ally, the Soviet Union. It has never
participated in the development of international law. it is
kept outside the workings of that law by the international
community of nations. It is a very small and weak state.
Although it is technically required and expected to observe
international law, it is denied an international forum with
regard to its external disputes. In comparison with the United
States, a great nuclear power, the People's Republic of Korea
is almost insignificant in might. Its actions therefore must
be observed not only against the requirements of the Law of
Nations, but against the propriety of the actions of the United
States as well.
2. The Claimants' Objectives Regarding the Pueblo
and its Seizure.
The United States, a major creator and sponsor of the
United Nations, had hoped thereby to maintain the status quo
in the world following the Second World War. Europe was to
be rebuilt; the defeated nations were to lose their conquered





states was to be humiliated, and the five great powers were
to benevolently and firmly cooperate in maintaining the peace
and preventing world conflagration.
The United States soon became disillusioned with the
ability of the United Nations to fulfill its purposes. The
Soviet Un<bon succeeded in setting up puppet regimes in every
Eastern European and Asian nation she occupied. One author
claims that she also assisted in the defeat of Nationalist
China at the hands of Mao Tse-tung.^09 At t^e game time, the
Soviet Union prevented United Nations interference by the use
of her negative vote and a technique called the "double-veto"
to undermine the deliberations and actions of the Security
Council. In June 1050, with the absence of the Soviet repre-
sentative, the United Nations succeeded for the first time in
repelling an invasion of South Korea—a threat to world peace.
The United States came to rely on regional arrangements to
contain Communism. This was viewed as legitimate self-defense
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The United
States considered that in saving the weaker nations from being
overtaken by communists, whether local or alien, it was actually
defending the United States. For the values involved— liberty,
freedom, and the right to pursue one's own destiny—were both
inclusive and exclusive in nature. The economic structure of


















the United States virtually required a free world in order
to survive and function for trade was essential to its opera-
tion. Much raore important was that the principles upon which
this country was founded required that, as it was no# a world
leader, it must universally defend and protect these inalienable
rights--not only for ourselves but, as custodians, for other
nations around the globe. The United States had hoped such
purHuits would be a world effort, but the United Nations was
not capable of the task as the United States saw it.
The immediate objectives of the United States in its
use of the Pueblo was the acquisition of information. This
was for defensive purposes as the United States saw it. Its
obligations to South Korea required that all available infor-
mation be gathered for defense should an attack come from the
North. The North was considered as an avaricious power, ready
to forcibly absorb South Korea and reunite the country. The
increased agitation and infiltration in the five months pre-
ceding the Pueblo seizure in fact justified United States
concern. 210 Indeed, this participant hoped that continued sur-
veillance and patrol would reduce the pressure on the South.
With the United States already occupied in South Viet-Nam
it is unlikely that there was any intent by that power to invade
or in any way commit what could be Ailed direct aggression
against the North Korean territorial integrity or political
210Chap. II, supra .
.n
95
independence at that time. Rather, intelligence-gathering
was considered as a method of self-defense. As the Pacific
Ocean was no longer considered enough assurance of protection
for the United states, its allies must be kept strong and
confident of United States assistance. From the United States
viewpoint the use of intelligence ships was not considered
aggression or a violation of international law.
The Notth Korean objectives were of a different nature.
That government considered its southern counterpart a puppet,
regime, and like its southern neighbor desires a reunification
under its own authority. North Koreans have for some time
violated the Armistice Agreement to further their government's
objectives, the boldest effort being the attempted assassi-
nation of the President of the Republic of Korea. 2^
The immediate objectives of the People's Democratic
Republic of Korea in seizing the Pueblo must be surmised as
proof is not available. Certainly that government wished to
halt the leak of military, geographical, and communications
information to the United States, the secrecy of which it
considered valuable, if not vital, to its defenses. Undoubt-
edly they hoped that such intelligence-gathering missions might
stop due to the inability of the United States to defend such
missions or to the clamor raised by irate nationals in the*
United States. It is probable that it also desired to weaken
21i




the alliance between the United States and South Korea by
showing the latter that its protector was a "paper tiger,"
unlikely to risk another war in Asia for South Korea—regard-
less of the provocation.
In addition, it appears that the North Korean Government,
ignored by its allies and lagging behind its enemy in develop-
ment, wished to bolster its image with its friends and generally
improve its position among the communist states and its own
people by showing "a threat" to its existence and a courageous
act of retaliation. 2]- 2
These goals are certainly of a defensive nature. Unless
some bold action was taken against the South and its ally
—
the United States, the South might invade the North. But if
the purpose of the seizure lay solely in impressing the dissat-
isfied people within the Democratic People's Republic, that
indeed there was a crisis so that Kim's regime would continue
secure, the seizure becomes aggressive and illegal and the claim
of self-defense could no longer be easily supported.
212N.Y. Times , Jan. 30, 1968, at 8, col. 4. Observers
reported prior to the Pueblo Incident that the regime of
Kim II Sung was in trouble, beset by economic and political
difficulties. The North Korean Government was having problems
with the U.S.S.R. and experiencing a cooling of relations with
Red China. A number of top-echelon party personnel had been
purged. Kim II Sung wanted his people to have more tothink
about than high taxes and a stagnating economy to support a
tremendous military machine.









3. The Methods Used by the Claimants
to Win Their Objectives.
The United States never claimed its use of intelligence-
gathering vessels in the Sea of Japan was delf-defense but
rather that it was an activity permissible, or at least not
prohibited, under existing international law. This is only a
partial explanation. The use of chemicals and biological
weapons of massive destruction were not prohibited as a matter
of international law during either world war, yet neither side
used such weapons because the result was unnecessary, extreme,
and wasteful of resources, and the sanctions against such
activity were substantial.
The use of these vessels was considered acceptable
because they were only coercive insofar as the one side knew
the other was acquiring information with every communication
it made. No military coercion existed. The sanctions were
adequate in that both sides could seize the other's vessels,
if necessary, in retaliation for a similar act on the other
side. Both could look to the law of the sea to enforce their
rights to maintain such use of the open sea under customary
international law. The Soviet Union and the United States,
being great naval powers, have equally as much to gain or lose
by ignoring the freedom of the open seas, as they understand it,
regarding intelligence vessels.
These vessels are basically defensive as they are used





especially submarine and aircraft communications systems.
These vessels themselves pose no threat of immediate hostile
armed attack nor do they precede one. Rather, they seem to
serve as a warning to their "victim" that prudence is the
best course to follow. The use of such vessels appears to be
a means of self-defense, rather than aggression. However,
there must be aggression before self-defense is justified,
certainly on the level of armed hostilities. Here, no armed
hostilities existed between North Korea and the United States.
No doubt a threat existed, as North Korea considered South
Korea and the United States enemies. The activities of the
North against the South were undoubtedly hostile. The presence
of the Pueblo was chosen as a heretofore permissible alternative
to retaliatory raddle which, while not actively harmful, would
not only provide useful information in the event of a conflict
but would discourage fufcther incursions into South Korea.
The North Koreans, on the other hand, claimed strict
observance of the Armistice and considered the Pueblo as a
threat to her military defensive shield. As a response to this
threat she had many modalities of self-defense under inter-
national law to choose, in order to settle her dispute with
the United States regarding the Pueblo ; diplomatic, mass
communications, economic and social pressures, and armed force
being the most common. Granted that economic and social pres-
sures could not successfully be brought to bear against the
39q«9
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United States by North Korea since neither economic nor social
interrelationships exist between the two parties, there are
other non-military coercive tactics available. North Korea
apparently made an attempt to use mass communications by
broadcasting warnings concerning the continued use by the
United States of "spy ships" off the coasts of Korea and its
readiness to act against them shortly if their use continued.
This occurred shortly before the Pueblo was seized. 2 ^3
Official diplomatic avenues were not readily available
since neither nation recognizes the other or maintains official
missions in the other's capital. Although the Military Armis-
tice Commission at Panmunjom was chosen as the forum to settle
matters after the seizure, the North Koreans did not use it as
a means of declaring their displeasure at the presence of the
vessel. Whether this was because they felt that it was a
dispute solely between the United States and themselves, un-
related to the Armistice and the United Nations Forces, or
because they believed negotiations of any kind would be fruit-
less, they chose to act through military coercion to bring to
an end an odious snooper, it is possible that military coercion
was chosen because it was the only modality which served the
213N.Y. Times , Jan. 27, 1968, at 1, col. 6. A Japanese
newspaper, Sankei Shimbun , said that North Korea had warned of
its readiness to act against the Pueblo two weeks before the
incident occurred. The broadcasts did not refer specifically
to the Pueblo but rather to the United States "spy ships"










objectives sought after. If this is the case, those objectives
would be coercive rather than self-defensive in nature. The
choice made—seizure of the vessel and its crew—when the
vessel could have been forcibly driven off, out of the coastal
seas or even beyond any claimed adjacent contiguous security
zones, especially when viewed together with the daaands of the
North Korean Government upon the Government of the United
States, indicates an apparent preference for aggressive tactics
by the North Korean authorities which weakens their claims that
they acted only in self-defense.
4. Limitatioas in Claims of Self-Defense .
The very conception of self-defense implies that
the purpose of the defender is to conserve its
values rather than extend them through acquiring
or destroying values held by the opposing partici-
pant. 214
The principle of conservation requires that only an effort
necessary to stop or repel an invasion of rights may be adopted
to the threatened party. 21 -5 Just as a massive attack permits a
massive retaliation, a minor invasion of rights or an inter-
ference with lesser values allows only a response sufficient
to prevent the denial of those rights.
In the Corfu Channel Case216 the International Court of
Justice held inter alia that Great Britain did not violate
international law by her naval vessels transversing the Corfu
Channel, an international strait, with guns manned and at the
McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 190, p. 222y 215 ld.
215 1949 I#C#J . Rep# 4 t at i69#
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ready since the Albanian armed interference prior to this
transnavigation (during which the British naval vessels
suffered substantial damage from mines located in the channel)
entitled the British to this action as a means of self-defense,
thus not depriving the transversal of its innocent nature
under international law.
This decision would appear to favor the United States
position in regard to the Pueblo seizure. The Pueblo repre-
sented no armed threat to the North Koreans. The values the
United States was attempting to preserve in maintaining the
Pueblo in the Sea of Japan were "enlightenment" : the acquisi-
tion of information of a scientific and military nature for
the security of the South Koreans as well as its own per-
sonnel; "well-being": the protection of its personnel in South
Korea and to maintain the peace and security of the world by
discouraging an incursion into South Korea by the North Korean
forces? "respect": by demonstrating to its allies and enemies
that the United States would honor its commitments around the
globe by performing its obligations as it considered necessary
for their defense? and, "power": in that the information
acquired would contribute to the arsenal of alternatives and
weapons at its disposal if hostilities do erupt.
At the same time, the values "threatened" by the presence
of the Pueblo appear, to Western eyes at least, to be compara-
tively insignificant. The territorial integrity and political
.-..< nsa
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independence of North Korea was in no way threatened. The
"well-being" and "self-respect" of that Government was
affected in an internal manner as loss of face was felt by the
vessel's presence. But neither South Norea, nor the communist
allies of the North, nor the world at large would respect the
People * s Democratic Republic of Korea less due to the presence
of the Pueblo in the Sea of Japan. The "power" value was not
substantially affected or diminished as a result of the intel-
ligence ship's presence, and it is difficult to see how the
internal power ofthe Government could be in any way detrimentally
affected.
As Professor McDougal points out, the denial of incon-
sequential or trivial rights or value claims even by armed
interference warrants appropriate remedies, retaliations, and
reciprocities other than high-level coercion. ^l 7 Therefore,
permissible self-defense is the right to exercise otherwise
illegal high-level military coercion to protect important and
substantial values—thereby implying the need for "necessity"
and "proportionality" in response to any attempt at the invasion
of substantial values.
Had there been any real thraat of invasion by the United
States based on the presence of the Pueblo, how much greater
would the invasion of North Korea be after it seized a Military





vessel and its crew belonging to a far stronger nation than
itself. The threat to the prinway values of the nations
attacked must always be kept in mind, for nations sincerely
seeking to maintain a peaceful world public order system will
not seize any and every incident to claim the right of self-
defense and proceed to launch a violent retaliation on the
state or its instrumentalities which allegedly caused the
first injury. Therefore, while the response of the North
Korean Government to the presence of the Pueblo is not sanc-
tioned by international law, a United States response to the
seizure of the Pueblo cannot logically extend to full retal-
iation under the doctrine of self-defense. There is an evident
distinction between the seizure of a foreign man-of-war, though
clearly not permitted by international law in peacetime, and
a threat to the territorial integrity or the political inde-
pendence of the nation whose vessel is seized sufficient to
justify a high level of military coercion made legal by a claim
of self-defense.— £ust as the United states failed to declare
war on Japan for the sinking of the Panay , a small military
vessel in China2 -*-8 but did not hesitate to do so after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The
difference in value destruction and appropriate and necessary
response is evident.
218See 15 Bull. <bf Int'l. News 9 (1930). The Hapanese













5. The Conditions Needed to Justify Claims of Self-Defense .
Self-defense can be validly invoked only after a rational
consideration of the factual elements involved. The relative
size and power of the participant charged with aggression, the
nature and consequences of the objectives, the character of
the power's internal structure, the type of coercion applied,
the world public order system it desires, and its expectation
of community intervention expected are all factors to be con-
sidered. 2 ^9
Undoubtedly North Korean decision-makers, in deciding to
seize the Pueblo , considered the above factors prior to
choosing the course they would follow. They realized that
the United States was immeasurably larger and more powerful
than North Korea. This, standing alone, would discourage any
retaliation in the form of a seizure. However, other aspects
had to be considered. The Soviet Union could be expected to
be as desirous of protecting the existence of the People's
Democratic Republic of Korea as the United States was anxious
to maintain in existence the Republic of Korea. This western
monolithic state was engaged in a land war in South Viet-Nam
which severely limited its ability to respond elsewhere. The
United States objectives were preventive in that it wanted to
deter an invasion of South Korea. Therefore the "aggression"







claimed by North Korea against the United States through the
Pueblo must rest in its taking information which, due to the
nature of that information, was in reality a threat to the
existence of that Korean Government. For it could not be
argued that the loss of prestige to North Korea created an
interference with values considered vital to it or the world
community. Certainly the United States did not want another
war on its hands in Korea, and it was obvious that the Pueblo
did not spearhead any projected invasion.
The internal structure of the united States also served
to influence the North Koreans' decision. Since its institu-
tions permitted popular pressure on the Government and the
war in Viet-Nam was becoming continually more unpopular, a
coercive response to the seizure of the Pueblo was not likely.
North Korean authorities could see that the United States did
not relish war and that its people considered human life a
very precious commodity. These factors would serve as a leaven-
ing to prevent further violence after the seizure.
The coercion being applied by the United states was
rather mild but it became intolerable for the North Koreans.
Substantial face was lost by the presence of the intelligence
ship and it feared that its allies were no longer particularly
interested in its progress. In any case, the coercion was
considered sufficient 5U8t i-f: ication by the North Korean
decision-makers, at least when considered with the remaining
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The United States wanted a relatively peaceful world and
desired a world public order system in which it could prosper
and grow and continue to oe the great power that it was. In
the North Korean view this would include some wars undoubtedly,
as such is necessary in their view for a capitalistic economy
to survive. Nevertheless, the United States was already
involved in one war—a costly one—and the world generally
resented United States efforts in Viet-Nara. Her allies traded
with her enemies. A relatively free and unified world was
necessary for United States prosperity, and all could be lost
by new anc more costly wars.
The United States could not have any illusions about
world assistance in Korea. The Pueblo project was strictly a
United States effort. The world community would hardly take
any action against North Korea should it seize an American
war vessel claiming "trespass." The Korean effort of the
United Nations of the 1950' s was the only attempt of that body
to enforce world peace on unwilling participants. It was not
likely to recur
The presence of the Pueblo was humiliating and the only
means of preventing intelligence-gathering was to take a
dramatic step. The United States would obviously insist that
intelligence-gathering was legal under international law,
based on the doctrines of extraterritoriality of war vessels






of others on those seas are not unreasonably infringed thereby.
Therefore, neither negotiations nor driving out the vessels
would serve a useful purpose. Only a seizure of one of the
intelligence ships might successfully force the United States,
based on world reaction and reaction at home, to cease the
missions entirely.
Once the vessel was seized fchd United States, nor charg-
ing North Korea with aggression, was forced to consider the
protagonist in light of the conditions existing at the time
of the seizure.
Here was a relatively weak and insignificant entity.
Yet North Korea had powerful and jealous friends and neigh-
bors who would consider any substantial retaliation, such as
a forcible attempt to recover the vessel, as a threat to
their territorial integrity and political independence. In
addition, such an effort would mean a second fighting zone
thousands of miles from the United States, yet adjacent to
the enemy J s sources of supply.
TIb the United States decision-makers, North Korea's
objective would appear to be the elimination of the presence
of American intelligence-gathering vessels near her shores
together with an attempt to humiliate the United States by
demonstrating that it could not defend its own vessels from
seizure by a small Asian nation. This would, hopefully,










in Asia, regarding the capacity of that State to protect them.
A general disrespect for the United States would be demonstra-
ted throughout the world. In turn. Communist states would gain
new regard for North Korea and her sinking image would be re-
placed by renewed cooperation and assistance from her allies.
The consequences, however, were light. The seizure was
humiliating to the United States. But prestige is linked with
power. The strength of the United states, and thus its power,
is beyond the wildest imaginings of all but a handful of the
nations in the world community. The loss of a single ship
under the circumstances could not have affected the prestige
of the United States. Therefore this primary objective failed.
For the same reason, the secondary objective also failed.
Various methods of intelligence-gathering continue regardless
of the efforts of the North Korean authorities.
The net result is that as no base value of substantial
importance to the United States was harmed by the actions of
North Korea, no claim of self-defense will properly lie for
United States invocation should that State desire to retaliate.
Even if the United States decided that the affront required
substantial retaliation as a proportional response to the
extreme act of seizure of a foreign vessel of war, it must be
remembered that the internal politics of North Korea—
a
dictatorship—effectively controls the people and could thus









impossible but also could also result in harm to the innocent
victim of the seizure—the crew of the vessel. There can be
no argument that the coercive nature of the seizure was hostile
and severe and intolerable under international law. Neverthe-
less, there exists no threat to the territorial integrity of
political independence of the United States itself unless we
adopt the fiction that a foreign man-of-war is a floating
portion of the flag state. Under the circumstances such an
approach would be less than rational.
Regardless of the world order system it desires, un-
doubtedly it would be in the nature of a communist dictatorial
democracy, the policies of acting to accomplish ends regard-
less of the means clearly indicates that the acts of the North
Korean Government was in fact aggressive. The world therefore
would never rally to the support of North Korea, although the
U.S.S.R. and Communist China might well assist her. it is
equally certain that the world community would not rally to
the support of the United States in an effort to recapture a
stolen naval vessel of little importance to the world at large.
The effort could well destroy the world and the risks are out
of proportion to any possible advantage that could be gained
from the enterprise.
The United States recognized at one time that "necessity"
is the most important condition in the application of the









standard was declared by Secretary of State Daniel Webster
in the Caroline incident of 1837
:
220
"necessity of that self
defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means or moment of deliberation': 221 No longer is this formula
recognized since it is unduly restrictive. 2 Nevertheless,
the only justification for anticipatory self-defense as a
legitimate means of coercion requires a goal less than invasion
of another state's territory.
The invocation of self-defense to justify military coer-
cion can only be legitimate and proper where substantial base
values are being or may well be completely destroyed and where
a minimum and limited response is made.
220See R.Y. Jennings, "The Caroline and McLeod Cases,"
32 A.J.I.L. 82 (1938). The facts were briefly as follows:
The Caroline was a steamer used by individual U.S. citizens
to help William L. MacKenzie, a defeated rebel leader from
upper Canada, attempt another invasion of the British colony.
The insurrectionists' activity, although strictly illegal,
was not suppressed by the United States. Therefore the British
took things into their own hands when, on Dec. 29, 1837, a
volunteer party crossed over to the American side of the Niagara
River and sent the Caroline over the Palls, aflame. At least
one American was killed in the foray. This created a substan-
tial international incident because this amounted to an invasion
of the United States by the British Army unit which did the
deed. The issue arose regarding what i3 self-defense and when
may it be invoked. See also Bailey, supra note 3, p. 199
et aeg.
212 Moore International Law 409-414 (1906), and note
220, supra .











6. Effects and Proportionality of the Responding Coercion .
The effects of the coercion, therefore, to legally permit
the responding coercive action must not only be madenocesssary
by the coercive acts of the participant to be charged with
aggression, but likewise must itself be limited in intensity
to that amount of force required which will properly and
effectively secure the objectives permissible and sought after
in the self-defense exerted.
The North Koreans may well be within their rights to
seize the Pueblo in order to achieve their objectives if the
Pueblo '
s
activities constitute aggression. This assumes that
no other less destructive means could be found to protect its
interests. It is difficult to demonstrate that the Pueblo '
s
activities were in fact aggressive.
The United States on the other hand was limited in its
options to retaliate for the seizure. It is probable that the
United States cannot claim any riljht of self-defense under
existing international law since neither its territory nor its
political independence, its economic strength, its government,
or its people were seriously threatened by the incident, except
of course the crew of the vessel which was captured with the
vessel. As no necessity exists, any violence threatening the
territory or political integrity of North Korea would be out
of proportion and could justify a censure of the United States
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by the United Nations under Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter.
The net result appears to indicate that a small nation
such as North Korea can violate customary international law
and remain beyond reach of the great states of the planet
whenever the insult is not worth the risk of a world in
flames.
I.
VI THE LIMITS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CORRECTING
THE INADEQUACY OP THE PRESENT WORLD ORDER SYSTEM
IN FACE OP A MILITARILY COERCIVE ACT
SUCH AS THE SEIZURE OP A WARSHIP
A. The Result of the Incident Relative to
International Law
The Pueblo Incident and its aftermath solved nothing as
far as the desires of the protagonists were concerned, and yet
reached the only possible solution necessarily outside of the
world public order system short of an actual world holocaust.
International law had no part in the solution of this diffi-
cult coercive situation, but rather the international facts
of life determined the result. This situation differed from
the Liberty incident, where Israel fired a missile at a
United States vessel gathering information, because Israel
was a friend, not an enemy. 223
North Korea did not deter the intelligence-gathering
activities of the United States, as was clearly demonstrated by
223












the EC 121 Incident of April 1969. 224 That government may have
harmed the prestige of the United States, but not in any sig-
nificant manner. The North Koreans gained much information
from the electronic gear and information on the vessel which
is difficult to value.
The United States failed to get t£e vessel back, but
succeeded in getting the men back, which certainly improved
its image as a humanitarian state in the eyes of the world.
The ship will be of little practical value to the North
Koreans, although the Soviet Union could make some use of
it as a vessel. No matter how costly, the United States will
make the vessel and its equpment obsolete --thereby rendering
even that acquisition valueless. Thus, the humaiiiaai<bas and
recriminations between the principals to the dispute and their
respective allies only worsen the distrust between the two
worlds, and nothing of positive significance has actually been
accomplished.
B. Acts Authorized in Intelligence-gathering Activities
by States under International Law
As "spying" is sanctioned by international law ,only if
and when such persons are captured within the territory of
224The Washington Star , Apr. 15, 1969, at 1, col. 8. It
should be noted that the North Koreans apparently partially suc-
ceeded in their goals. No American intelligence-gathering ships
are known to have sailed near the North Korean coasts since the
seizure of the Pueblo , as of December 28, 1968. See Buffalo
Evening News , Dec. 28, 1968, at A2, col. 3.
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another state where they are pursuing their activities are
they subject to punishment as provided for such offenses
under the municipal law of that state.
1. Space Spying .
The "spy in the sky" or the orbiting satellites are
not prohibited by international law. Historically, interna-
tional law was formed by the practice of states, as indicated
by the development of the law regarding tertitorial waters
described earlier in this paper. Only two nations are pres-
ently capable of engaging in placing orbiting saateklites for
information-gathering, or any purpose, into space. Both states
have apparently decided to refrain from attempting to acquire
title to any part of space, but rather keep space open and
"free"—akin to the concept of freedom of the open seas.
International law at present prohibits no activity in free
space. Both states have orbiting satellites which report to
their receiving stations in the launching state whatever is
seen through cameras or heard through radio and radar receivers.
Only the United States and the Soviet Union are capable of
interfering with such activity or participating in it, and both
have chosen by practice to allow such activities and to main-
tain a "peaceful space."
2. Activities in the Airspace .
As we get closer to Earth we see a different development
of the law. Since World War I the nations of Earth have
I... wsl
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jealously guarded their airspace. The Paris Convention on
Aerial Navigation of 1919225 declares in Article 1: "every
Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the aia*
space above its territory.. . ."In addition, there is no
right of innocent passage of any aircraft through the air-
space above its territory except by treaty. The 1958 Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea makes this quite clear. 226
The U-2 incident in May 1960 demonstrated what a clear vio-
lation of international law can mean in consequence of a
failure of intelligence gathering through use of military air-
craft. 227 Any violation of a state's airspace by a foreign
military aircraft justifies that state in forcing that craft
to land within its territory by any means and subjects the
pilot thereof to prosecution.
22511 L.N.T.S. 173.
O O fc\
Bishop, supra note 161, at 373. See Lissitzyn, "The
Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice in Inter-
national Law," 47 A. J. I. L.. 559 (1953). See also U.S. Naval
War College, supra note 32, at 122, n. 133.
227
In May 1960 a U-2 aircraft, flown by Gary Powers of
the United States (of the CIA) was shot down allegedly by the
Soviet Union while well within the latter' s airspace. It pro-
duced at first a denial, and then an admission from top United
States Government officials that the mission had been officially
authorized to fly over the airspace of the Soviet Union in vio-
lation of international law. The result was a spy trial for
Gary Powers and a refusal by the Soviet Prmier to meet with the
President of the United States in a previously scheduled summit
conference. See Encyclopedia Britannica 196t , Book of the Yeat,
p. 355, for a terse review of the incident and its aftereffects.
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Intelligence Gather ing Activities at Sea.
The Pueblo Incident added a completely new dimension to
the intelligence-gathering systems of the great powers.
The Soviet Union and the United States accepted the fact
that international law in providing for (1) freedom of the open
seas and (2) the extraterritoriality of foreign men-of-war
virtually protected intelligence-gathering in the open seas
adjacent to the victim state as long as it was pursued under
those mantles. Since such activity could not be prevented,
both States used these activities for protection. Trespassing
into foreign territorial waters could lead to an embarrassing
"snafu" because these Powers did not wish to publicize their
snooping activities, and the sanctions provided by international
law entitled the other to drive off an interloper from its
territorial seas. Such an occurrence would prove embarrassing.
A seizure, however, was undoubtedly never contemplated by either
side because it was considered legally impossible and undefen-
sible and could create a very substantial international crisis.
C. Sanctions Against such Intelligence-Gathering
Activities Provided by International Law
1. Sanctions Against Satellites in Space .
The sanctions against spying on outer space, besides
those of a monetary or technological nature, would permit the
state injured by such activity to (1) send a spy satellite up
to snoop on the other party; (2) scramble and confuse the enemy







and other international efforts through international organs
or local embassies to deter the "spying" state from its acti-
vities. To shoot down the "spy satellite" would be question-
able at best because it would introduce violence to space, not
to mention that the "fallcut" from such an act of destruction
could injure innocent third parties below. Space is free and
can be so used as long as it does not interfere with the rights
of others in space. As of now there is no law specifically
providing sanctions for or against orbiting intelligence-
gathering satellites.
2. Sanctions Against the Use of Airspace for Intelligence
Gathering .
The sanctions provided for violations of a state's air-
space by a foreign state's airships in time of peace are met
forth in the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of 1919. 228 It
provides that it can prohibit all private craft from flying
over its territory for military or safety purposes, and that
no military or other state aircraft of foreign states may fly
over or land in a state's territory without permission. If such
aircraft do "trespass" and then land in foreign territory, they
are entitled to no extraterritorial privileges. Any foreign
aircraft crossing a state's airspace can be forced to land
within that jurisdiction and be subject to the laws of that
state. No projection is granted by international law. if an
228
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 51, at 519-21.
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alien is suspected of spying he can be tried under the local
laws. There is no "innocent passage" of aircraft in foreign
airspace.
3. Sanctions Provided by International Law to Intelligence-
Gathering Vessels on the Seas.
The sanctions available to a foreign man-of-war's pres-
ence in the seas off the coast of the victim state are quite
limited in international law because of the protections granted
to such vessels. Assuming that the 1958 Convention applies and
has a status as international law, a foreign man-of-war beyond
twelve nautical miles is beyond even the contiguous zones of
littoral states and can use the open seas in any way she desires
subject only to the limitation that such activity will not un-
reasonably interfere with the rights of others in their use of
the open seas. 229
But assuming that a violation of the territorial seas or
the applicable contiguous zones by a foreign warship, the
adjacent state can complain through diplomatic channels or, if
necessary, drive the culprit out of its territory. Seizure is
prohibited since a foreign man-of-war clearly possesses an
extraterritorial status. Under present international law intel-
ligence-gathering beyond the jurisdiction of the coastal state
is as reasonable a use of the open seas as is fishing.
See the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Seas and
the Contiguous Zone, art. 24(2). See also 1958 Convention on
the High Seas, art. 2.
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Whese sanctions work well between large nations with
interests that encompass the world community. They will
function almost perfectly where the interaction between the
parties exists on a more or less equal plane. Both the
United States and the Soviet Union use warships as intelligence-
gathering media. A violation by one of these states against
the other would bring an easily determined and proportional
response
—
perhaps a seizure for a seizure, or such other
action which could be taken where both states wish to main-
tain a good image in the world community.
International law provides no guidelines or sanctions
regarding initial action or response to acts of an aggressive
nature between small states such as North Korea and large
states like the United States. North Korea has no intelligence
ships against which the United States could take action.
There is no forum in which she can be taken to task and made
to account for her aggressive actions. North Korea has no
interest whatever in recognizing a right to use intelligence
vessels by other member states of the world community.
So, while international law capable of solving this
problem is developing, it remains for the individual members
of the world community of nations, especially the great powers,
to control their behavior in response to acts taken against
them which are unsanctionable under present international law.
Only by such self-discipline can an answer to this dilemma
x ert3 £ x/5
.enfilq I
as aqxrfasBw
jix»pB «e^B^8 3E9ff:' A .mi i£g
l8nox:h rf^
38 6 eqerfisq—sanoqasi
; ©d ' OB
boop 6 ni:B3
6a io ai :>n asJbi fc^Bniorlnl
9ViBB9'3H?p6 I
ue as^B^e I siu^sn
9?Ib h aqirfa
^b&r bM sftaai od nerfB: ad -;6o erfe rfoxrfw nx muicfi on si •asfrT
. eno bo* eviea:
,\ bIbbp
8-L 108 lo f
aiacfoism If oiq
121
be found without the risk of a total destruction of the present
world order process.
D. Ultra Vires Acts and Their Consequences
The seizure is quite clearly beyond the existing law as
it is not a recognized sanction in international law. The
"aggression" by the vessel cannot be considered so serious an
aggression, if it is aggression at all, as to justify the
violent military solution used by North Korean naval forces.
In 1866, an American sailing vessel, the General Sherman ,
sailed up the Han River to break the isolation of, and open
trade with, the Kingdom of Korea. When the vessel reached whfet
is now Seoul the tides ebbed, stranding the schooner on a
sand bar. The Korean forces, on orders from the monarch,
fired the vessel and massacred the crew. in the Spring of
1871 the United States sent a squadron of five ships under
Rear Admiral Rofers to Seoul, and after being fired upon a
landing party was dispatched to avenge the insult and the mas-
sacre. After destroying a number of Korean forts and killing
over two hundred of the Korean forces in the rout, the squadron
withdrew. 230
The violence of the North Korean actions could have reaped
a whirlwind of vengeance . At first the United States Government
demanded immediate redress or threatened dire qnd drastic con-
sequences which might well have been justifiable under
°N.Y. Times , Jan. 24, 1968, at 15, col. 6. See also











international law and United States historical practice.
Reason prevailed. The demand for the vessel's return was aban-
doned and a humble apology to the North Koreans secured the
release of the Pueblo '
s
crew. This did not come about through
the legal sanctions provided by the jurisprudence under which
the international community functions, but rather it was the
international political situation which prevented a United
States retaliation which might easily have led to a third global
conflict in a century. For to seize a doreign warship in time
of peace is clearly an "aggressive" act justifying a declaration
of war even under the definition provided by the Soviet Union
for United Nations consideration. ^31 it serves as little conso-
lation that the North Korean Government was right in its belief
that the United States would take no step which would impair the
lives of the eighty-two crewmen of the vessel, involve the
United States in another Viet-Nam, or risk a third world war.
Preservation versus destruction of the world lay in the victory
of reason over pride, and most frequently in history reason is
the loser.
The sanctions available to the United States in this case,
short of bombing or invasion of Wonson where the Pueblo was
first impounded, were minimal. North Korea is a nation which is
231Hansen, supra note 199, at 93, wheee the Soviet
Union's examples of direct aggression include: "... the
carrying out of a deliberate attack on the ships of air-














under the protective nuclear umbrella of a powerful world
state. At the same time this little state will insist on
determining its exclusive interests and values as well as
its inclusive interests and values in the world community.
North Korea has no world commitments or obligations and is
interested solely in its own advantage and progress on a
plane much below its nuclear-powered allies and enemies. It
has only a small naval force and its nautical interests extend
only so far as its fishing fleets ply the seas and to the edge
of its limited demesne. The United States, with world encom-
passing power, has responsibilities of equal expanse. It
cannot act carelessly and recklessly since every decision will
undoubtedly have international implications. Her ships ply
the world seas and her aircraft its skies, and its spacecraft
probe the universe. The parochial values are not part of the
United States concern for virtually all of its values, even its
exclusive ones, are,because of the power of the United States,
inclusive in its nature.
IH short. North Korea could afford the gamble in seizing
an American vessel of war. The United States dared not risk a
vengeful retaliation, no matter how justifiable. Whatever
navy North Korea has would dare not venture into the open seas
alone, and thus the United States is deprived of even a propor-
tional retortion. Any attack on the Korean mainland to recover











unthinkable for the United States. For the United States
would lose a vast amount of prestige should she so violently
disregard the United Nations Charter, even if her actions
would not mushroom into an international destruction of
community values. Sanctions for large states against small
states which do violence to international law do not exist





The situation appears to leave an ultimate choice among
three alternatives: First, we can condemn intelligence-
gathering activities altogether, thus placing the burden of
potential violation upon the powers which use devices to
acquire otherwise unavailable information. Or, sanctions can
be provided whereby some force is permitted by injured nations
against those states who interfere with such activities so
that the information-seekers can prevent the loss of their
intelligence-gathering personnel and equipment. Thirdly,
would be to require the states who are inquisitive to "assume
the risk" of their activities. The decision rests upon
which alternative will most minimize the risk of international
conflagration and yet be most acceptable to the members of
the community within the present world order system.
The first two alternatives are virtually impossible.
Neither of the great powers, who failed to conclude a disarm-
ament areaty because of lack of trust between them,will give
up the right to gather intelligence. Without the cooperation
of these states any decision by the remaining members of the
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same token, the community of states will not accept any
treaty or system of sanctioning power that interferes with
their rights to keep the large nations from dominating their
affairs. Effective sanctions against seizures are therefore
unlikely to be acceptable to any nation. Either of these
alternatives, even if adopted, would actually increase tension
throughout the world. The banning of intelligence-gathering
wofcld increase fears and suspicions of the opponent by both
sides. The result could be a greater possibility of an
accidental nuclear conflagration. At the same time, a pro-
vision in international law to permit limited violence suffi-
cient to prevent Pueblo-type seizures would only be a reversion
to the "just war" concept of Grotius and further endanger the
peace of the world. International politics require that the
great nations work to maintain the confidence of the smaller
nations within their sphere of influence, or risk lo§ing them
to the other side. The Soviet Union could never insist that
North Korea return the Pueblo , because such an act would
undermine any influence the Soviet Union possessed over that
little state. Any new system tolerating intelligence-gathering
likewise will fail for lack of adequate sanctions from the
great powers' viewpoint.
As it is unlikely that the present world order system
will experience any substantial change in the future toward
accommodation of intelligence-gathering, only the actors can
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provide protection for their interests in the area of securing
information. In light of the current international power
process, it is apparent that United states naval activities
in the Sea of Japan was at least acceptable in international
law and practice. In contradistinction to the Quarantine
Interdiction^^ placed upon Soviet vessels delivering guided
missiles to Cuba in late 1962, where the existence of the
nations of the Western Hemisphere was threatened, justifying
defensive action by those states, the People's Democratic
Republic of North Korea was never threatened with direct injury
of any kind. The threat of nuclear missiles is much more
direct than an unarmed intelligence vessel. The coercion of
the former is more immediate than that represented by the
latter. The United States response to the Cuban missile threat
presented by the Soviet Union, and so directed against her,
could be more easily tolerated than North Korea's actions
against the United States.
The burden falls upon the United States and the Soviet
Union and any other Nations that may wish to pursue aggres-
sive intelligence-gathering machinery, where international law
fails to provide effective limitations on the procedure due
to recent technological advances, to protect their own acti-
vities by whatever means of defense they have. This defense
232See Mallison supra note 203, for an inquiry into the
facts and legal implications of the Cuban Blockade of October
1962.
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must be strictly defensive in nature and purpose, and local
in effect. Escort vessels for intelligence ships or escort
aircraft for legitimate intelligence aircraft could be one
form of protection. Should these efforts be unsuccessful or
not used, the party to whom the vehicle gathering intelligence
belongs should be required to bear the loss—regardless of a
violation by the victim state of existing international law.
The actual situation created by the Pueblo Incident and its
aftermath was fortuitous. It would be advantageous for the
peace of the world to consider such practice as international
law. Whenever intelligence-gathering missions fail due to
the acts of the victim states which the "attacker state" is
at the time of the failure helpless to prevent, such failures
to and the resultant loss in prestige and property (exclusive
of personnel, who should be returned) must be borne by that
state.
It would be only through such a practice that the
development and maintenance of the important inclusive values
of the world community could be maximized and the destructive
values such as pride, ambition, and greed between nations be
deemphasized so that, even without a world order system or
specific international law to prevent destructive incidents
such as the Pueblo seizure, the terrible consequences that
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